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SUBJECTIVITY AND THE DISCOURSE OF VICTIMHOOD IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Abstract
This study contends that the South African truth and reconciliation process can be usefully 
understood in terms of discourse in general and subjectivity/subject-positioning in particular. 
The potential of these concepts to illuminate and characterize the national reconciliation aims 
of the truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) remains somewhat under-exploited in the 
literature. Positioned within a broad theoretical framework, a Foucauldian analytic was used to 
assess officially produced texts and talk that structured subjectivity in relation to the discourse 
of victimhood, the discursive resources drawn on by TRC commissioners and the subject- 
positions formed. Through discursive repertoires the research looks at repertoires of 
victimhood, specifically in terms of nationhood and empathy, emerging from statements of 
commissioners of the TRC during the Human Rights Violations hearings, and examined the 
positioning effect they had on subjects. In relation to this I have attempted to shed light not 
only on the constructed nature of individuals’ positioning but also how they become subject to 
particular discourses and practices: how identities were shaped and capacities (among other 
things) constructed and mobilized in the light of victimhood and in the context of the TRC 
hearings. Data sources for the study include the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act of 1995, the Final Report of 2003 and transcripts of victim hearings 
conducted by the Commission.
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Chapter One
AIM AND OBJECTIVES
1.1 Rationale and background
Introduction
This dissertation examines subjectivity and the discourse of victimhood in relation to the 
prominent South African truth and reconciliation process. This process, carried out in practice 
through the participatory strategy of “victim hearings” orchestrated by the truth and 
reconciliation commission (TRC), was designed for re-telling and re-capturing the full scope of 
Apartheid-era atrocities. In this regard, storytelling -  stories of individual “victims”, categorized 
and subjectivized as the primary narrative agents -  became mobilized as a tool for bringing 
about “national reconciliation” (Humphrey, 2005:203). What is striking here is that acts of 
storytelling became synonymous with acts of participation, in this case in the overarching 
project of national reconciliation involving a strategic coordination between victims and 
perpetrators of past injustice and a range of state and non-state actors across the public 
sector.
Debate about truth commission projects, especially the kind experimented with in South Africa, 
are replete with discussions about “participation”. Arguably, this is because the South African 
case is a model of what may be termed participatory reconciliation, developed largely in 
alignment with a national rebuilding project unprecedented in its aims, urgency and challenges. 
It was amid and through this extraordinary mechanism that testimonies emerged and were 
engaged with as part of what was designed to be an open, inclusive and collective national
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rebuilding process centred primarily upon victims. This overall emphasis distinguished the TRC 
from other truth commissions created all over the world since the 1970s. Supporters of the 
TRC argue that by opening up the floor to active citizens bound together by common 
experiences and stories of victimization participation was at once inclusive, transparent and 
averse to centrally imposed ideas. On the one hand, analysts like Alex Boraine stress the 
importance of the TRC being not only victim-centred and restorative but also espousing a 
participatory paradigm of cooperation. In this case, it allowed “victims and perpetrators to 
appear together” for the purpose of fostering a “healing process” in the country (Boraine, 
2000:293). Other commentators like Johnny de Lange, on the other hand, highlight the 
historical, processual nature of this participatory agenda. For him, the TRC “marks a unique 
moment in world history. It was the first time that a nation had created a truth commission 
through a public and participatory process" (de Lange, 2000:14). Through participation by the 
way of telling (and moderating) stories1, subjects of victimization emerged within participatory 
spaces, spaces where the discourse of victimhood interspersed with a “therapeutic ethos” and 
the broader aims of national reconciliation2.
The TRC process began with “the assumption that it helps individuals to tell their stories and to 
have those stories acknowledged officially. Victims, therefore, [were] encouraged to tell as 
much of their stories as they wish[ed] to reveal, without regard for its relevance to the 
determination of guilt” (Aldana, 2006:111). As a quasi-judicial organization, the South African
1 1n this study I use the terms storytelling and testimony somewhat interchangeably.
2 Geared towards the management of subjectivity, the therapeutic ethos is characterized by a 
heightened form of “self-referencing”, an increased emphasis on emotions and the rise of therapeutic 
professionalism, among others (Nolan, 1998:2-21). For Nikolas Rose, the therapeutic is to be 
understood as a norm operating in the context of hierarchical relationships with authorities who promote 
the therapeutic not only as a “generosity of expertise" (Rose, 1998:89) but as a means of “shaping, 
channelling and enhancing subjectivity” (Rose, 1989:213). Working in connection with the rising 
influence of this ethos is a therapeutic discourse. Therapeutic discourse is the domain of 
psychological/psychotherapeutic frameworks with registers in the areas of counselling, theology, social 
work and now in truth and reconciliation. Rose (1989, 1996b, 1999) and Nolan (1998) regard this 
discourse as the proliferation of circuits of expert knowledge that gives privilege to specific 
understandings of self, identity and subjectivity.
TRC did not concern itself with the determination of guilt but aimed to operate strictly from a 
framework of reconciliation that was by extension a demonstration of an innovative social- 
psychological approach to addressing the political. As such the stories that victims were 
encouraged to tell were not told in a narratological or political vacuum but were built on 
discursive systems which framed understandings of truth, reconciliation, forgiveness and 
victimhood and positioned subjects in relation to them. While the word “victim” may not have 
been used directly in the hearings or official documents, the strategy of the TRC was 
unequivocally “victim-centred” and did follow the multidirectional path a victimhood discourse 
made available (see du Toit, 2000; Leman-Langlois, 2000). Arguably, this discourse was 
fundamental to the operations of the TRC, transforming the fact of individuals’ victimization into 
normative ideas of victimhood and therefore contributing to a particular understanding of 
experience in which the identity of “victim” became the pivotal marker of subjectivity (Ross, 
2003a)3.
Background to the TRC
From 1960 to 1994 several thousands of people suffered the brutal effects of political violence 
in South Africa and Apartheid became synonymous with all kinds of human rights abuses, 
including politically motivated killings, torture, oppression, kidnappings and ambushing -  
primarily from the regime but also the resistance. Through the hearings of the TRC, it emerged 
that these atrocities were committed by various agencies -  including the South African police 
and so-called “death squads” instituted by the South African state -  from the late 1960s (Pillay, 
2005). According to the TRC Act and the Report, the Commission centred its work largely
3 To be sure, in the TRC victimhood was aligned with an officially recognized identity entailing particular 
rights and entitlements to benefits (such as public acknowledgment of wrongdoing or reparations) 
(Humphrey, 2003; Posel & Simpson, 2002).
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around the victims of these crimes -  including mothers, youth, former activists and friends and 
relatives. As the Report puts it, “The story of apartheid is, amongst other things, the story of 
the systematic elimination of thousands of voices that should have been part of the nation’s 
memory. The elimination of memory took place through censorship, confiscation of materials, 
bannings, incarceration, assassination and a range of related actions. Any attempt to 
reconstruct the past must involve the recovery of this memory” (TRC Final Report 2003, 
Volume One:201). Indeed, these atrocities had their share of victims, and the concern with 
victimization led to the situation where the hearings became known for the most part as “victim 
hearings” (see TRC Final Report 2003, Volume One; Tutu, 1999). This focus steered the 
direction of the public hearings -  about 95 of them -  that the TRC conducted.
The TRC began life in 1995 as an agency of the Government of National Unity, inaugurated 
following a negotiated settlement that ended Apartheid in 1994 and following the Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 35 of 1994, which was brought before and passed 
into law by Parliament on 16 December 1995. At inception the Commission was charged with 
the responsibility of fostering national reconciliation and healing after decades of atrocities 
fuelled to a large extent by the Apartheid system, through which a minority white population 
denied political participation to the majority black population. Associated with the TRC’s 
mandate was the task of inviting victims and perpetrators to bear witness to the atrocities of 
the past by way of storytelling. In fact, at its preliminary meeting -  which took place on 16 
December 1995 -  Tutu established the narrative framework of the Commission, one that was 
grounded within its broader institutional, political and discursive context. Setting out the “terms” 
of the narrative structure, Tutu laid emphasis on an ethics of listening, speaking and 
interaction. Indeed this manifested in the relationship between the testifier and the 
commissioners during the hearings during which the commissioners set the background for the 
narrative that was to follow. On the basis of this narrative system of disclosure, the
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Commission was also tasked with the objective of granting amnesty to the perpetrators of 
crimes relating to human rights violations and providing reparation and rehabilitation. The 
preamble of the Act recognized the atrocious legacies of Apartheid and set out with the aim of 
creating a future where human rights and reconciliation were social possibilities in the new 
South Africa (TRC Act, Chapter Three [see Appendix A]).
The TRC consisted of three main committees: the Human Rights Violations Committee, the 
Amnesty Committee and the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee. While the other 
committees played significant roles, the Human Rights Violations Committee (HRVC) was 
arguably the main pillar of the TRC, and the activities of the others revolved directly or 
indirectly around it. In all, there were 17 persons appointed as commissioners of the TRC. As 
authority figures the commissioners played a pivotal role in eliciting the narratives. They were 
agents who shaped and transformed the testimony-giving event -  who facilitated storytelling. 
Arguably, each came from a background of expertise, including psychologists and social 
workers, theologians, human rights activists and legal practitioners. Under the chairpersonship 
and deputy chairpersonship of Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Alex Boraine respectively, the 
Commission’s proceedings began on 16 December 1995, a day which was already symbolic in 
the national imaginary as it commemorated the Afrikaner defeat of Zulus. The date was 
chosen for the TRC because of its importance and led to the public holiday named “Day of 
Reconciliation”. The public hearings commenced in April of 1996 and went on for two years.
The activities of the HRVC revolved around gross human rights violations that occurred 
between 1960 (when the infamous Sharpeville massacre occurred) and 1994, to which it 
received over 20,000 statements comprising over 50,000 incidents of abuses and atrocities 
from victims. The HRVC emerged as a mechanism for weaving narrative threads about human 
rights and history together. Through testifiers deemed to be representative of those whose
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human rights had been violated by the Apartheid regime, the HRVC orchestrated and 
produced complex stories of harm, suffering and violence in hearings that took place in several 
locations across South Africa throughout its two-year operational period (1995-1997). At each 
hearing victims publicly told their stories to a panel of between 3 and 17 commissioners and 
committee members as well as to many more lay audience members seated in the venues. 
These hearings were not only held publicly, they were given wide coverage in the media: live 
broadcasts ran on television and radio, summaries were included in newspapers and verbatim 
transcripts were published on the Commission’s website.
Wherever they took place, whether the venues were churches, school gymnasiums, town halls 
or civic centres, the hearings took on a fairly simple discursive ritual and were largely designed 
to make testifiers feel free, secure and important to the whole process (see Tutu, 1999; 
Andrews, 2003). Each day’s hearings began with introductory comments from the chairperson 
and also a roll call of names of persons scheduled to testify on the day. After this the testifier 
would be motioned to a seat on the platform, alongside a “briefer”. Each session began with 
commissioners’ explanations of the event that not only created context and also prepared 
testifiers for their stories but also gave each storytelling meaning and significance. The 
chairperson would then provide a brief introduction in relation to the individual before asking 
her/him to take the oath. One of the commissioners, called “facilitator” in this context, would 
then ask the victim to give a personal background and then to tell her or his story. The 
commissioners’ talk were also often religious and psychotherapeutic, significantly marked by 
role-playing, emotional and religious fervour, and they were sympathetic. On the initiative of 
Tutu there were occasions when the hearings were accompanied by Christian rituals -  the 
lighting of candles, praying and hymn-singing (Boraine, 2000). This aimed primarily at 
constructing an atmosphere of “healing” and reconciliation but only served to enforce the idea 
that this was a space in which victimhood played out.
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1.2 Research Aim and Objectives
Aim and Objectives
The main aim of this project is to analyse the role of discourses of victimhood in the work of the 
TRC. This aim is operationalized through a set of two interrelated objectives: one, highlighting 
the discursive strategies surrounding the construction and positioning of victimhood in the 
TRC’s activities and; two, examining the mechanics of hearings and the repertoires emerging 
from the experts’ talk. Interrogating the idea of the “victim” and tracing its operation in the TRC 
discourse, I hope to show how people who identify, or who are identified, as victims were 
invited to take up that subject-position. I shall be applying a Foucauldian lens to the study, 
meaning that rather than focusing on victims per se the focal point will in large part be the 
systems of ideas, or “discourses”, which construct and position victims. These discourses 
emerge from documents as well as comments by authority figures in the context of the 
proceedings of the TRC.
Whilst the institutional discourse of truth and reconciliation was a main part of the TRC’s 
reality, I shall limit this investigation to another discourse that existed -  often side by side -  
with that of truth and reconciliation: the discourse of victimhood. This discourse was germane 
at many levels and has implications for ideas about registers of subjectivity -  including 
participation and positioning. To clarify, in problematizing victimhood my argument is that it 
was constructed. Yet espousing this constructionist view does not mean that I believe that 
experiences of oppression dealt by the Apartheid regime are false but that there are deep- 
seated that can only be approached by taking this view. While this is not often visible 
victimhood discourses do construct an array of spaces that can be available or reducible to the 
material and immaterial practices of government. Although this particular discourse offered the
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victims of Apartheid opportunities for redress and reparation, arguably the language was also 
narrow to some degree.
Despite the good intentions that motivated the TRC, it is my view that it was plagued by 
assumptions that inadvertently promoted stereotypic depictions of victimhood, and thus failed 
to address either the complex politics or the nuances of what being a “victim” involves (Ross, 
2003a). Ultimately, the discourses built around victimhood have sedimented meanings around 
the experience of victimization and they ascribe a particular expression of voice to victimness. 
What this does, I believe, is place upon the individual the burden of living up to the archetypical 
profile of the “true” victim and problematically feeds her testimony to pain and suffering into the 
objectives of truth and reconciliation in the Commission’s hearings.
Research Questions
In line with the research aim and objectives, answers would be sought for two main questions: 
What are the discourses of victimhood and how were they discursively constructed at the 
hearings of the TRC? How was the subject-position of “victim” constructed in official 
discourses of the commission and by what mechanisms was this position constituted at the 
hearings? Yet, in asking these questions my intention here is not to be deterministic or to 
conflate the programme of the TRC “with a real subject, subjectivity or subject-position, i.e. 
with a subject that is the endpoint or terminal of [this programme]” (Dean, 1999:32). I take as a 
starting point the belief that what programmes such as truth and reconciliation do is to “elicit, 
promote, facilitate, foster and attribute various capacities, qualities and statuses to particular 
agents” (Dean, 1999:32).
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The research utilizes a discourse-analytic approach to highlight the ways in which the category 
and concept of victimhood, implicit in the political discourses and hearings of the TRC, 
contribute to processes within which participation is encouraged, stories are invited and 
subject-positions emerge. The enquiry starts out from a “thicker”, theoretically informed 
conceptualization of the process of creating and mobilizing victimhood. How an individual 
becomes inserted into the subject-position of “victim” can be partly traced through discourse. 
What is of interest here is how discourse -  at the level of practice -  governs the terrain of truth 
and reconciliation by establishing parameters for defining “problems” and proffering solutions 
accordingly. Hence, congruent with a broad constructionist perspective I hope to bring to the 
fore the ways in which these discourses have influenced normalized ways of conceptualizing 
both the “victim” and victimhood. Here victimhood is understood to be a discourse constructed 
in deliberate ways in the context of the TRC. As I will argue, a specific discourse of victimhood 
is shaped through other discourses (such as therapy, justice, empowerment, national 
reconciliation, public participation, and so on) not only to frame and to control its interpretation 
but to provide a wider rationale for the work and workings of government. Through historical 
“knowledges” surrounding and ensconcing victimhood, the victimhood discourse is able to 
produce its own reality through its effect on individuals’ positioning and testimonies.
My approach to the interrogation of the discourse of victimhood and subjectivity is generally 
influenced by the Foucauldian notions of discourse and subject-positioning. From this 
perspective, the stated TRC objective of giving the victim of Apartheid-era atrocities a voice 
cannot be taken at face value. Instead, the discourses and politics involved in the project of 
truth and reconciliation are taken as having manifold effects -  powerful, enabling and 
subjectivizing all at once. It seems pertinent, therefore, not only to examine how victimhood 
discourses played out and were interacted with (or in fact resisted) in the spaces of the TRC,
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but how these discourses feed into as well as demonstrate the potentials and paradoxes of the 
sociopolitical formations through which subjects are produced and positioned.
This dissertation begins on an important premise: instead of thinking of the TRC as a discrete, 
abstract entity I follow Foucauldian thought in focusing on its practices -  in this case, its 
discourses. These are practices that structure and even produce the contexts for the 
relationship between programmes of the state and the subject in the significant spaces of 
nation rebuilding. They also refer not only to institutions like the TRC but also those forms of 
knowledge, vocabularies, practices of calculation and so on, that help to produced designated 
social subjectivities (such as victimhood) and also structured and produced the worlds they 
engaged with. Rather than assuming the inevitability of victimhood, I ask how ideas about the 
victim were produced, figured and employed in concrete political discourses.
1.3 Anticipated Contribution of the Study
In this study I do not join the debate as to whether the TRC was effective, useful or successful. 
Rather, what I set out to do is to turn an interrogative gaze on the discourses that the TRC 
nurtured and deployed, specifically analysing the ways in which the discourse of victimhood 
constructed, subjectified and positioned the category of people labelled “victims”. Although at a 
broader scale I am interested in the experiences of these individuals, their subjectivities and 
the stories they told before the TRC, in the present study I do not begin from these 
experiences. Rather, as a way of situating the political context and the complex assemblages 
of discourse in the activity of the Commission I shall be looking at the “making” of the victim in 
the political discourse of the TRC. As a starting point, then, I will be deploying the concept of
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victimhood as an analytic framework to bring into sharp focus the discursive mechanisms that 
positioned subjects according to the stated aims of the Commission.
My research follows the tradition in (critical) human geography of considering the pivotal role 
that discourse plays in the complex matrix involving subjects, subjectivities and subject- 
positions (Pile & Thrift, 1995; Rydin, 2005). By following a “critical” path, I will be examining the 
discursive elements of the TRC hearings -  that are prone to be taken for granted, highlighting 
their potency, dynamism and vulnerabilities at the same time. Here I follow Foucauldian 
studies of discourse and subjectivity theory to explicate specific practices of the TRC such as, 
on the one hand, the inscription of specific systems of knowledge on the psyches of subjects 
and, on the other hand, the discursive organization of subjects’ worlds through knowledges 
about victimhood and through a mobilization of the discourse of participation. On the whole, I 
see the research as making potentially distinct contributions to political and cultural geography, 
specifically as it grounds the theoretical concerns of subjectivity, subject-positioning and 
discourse in empirical analysis, thus creating a framework for gaining critical purchase on other 
interconnected concerns. At the same time, the study can offer useful inputs to further 
understanding the role of the TRC hearings in making available a political space through which 
human agency operated in various forms, an understanding that can be profitably appropriated 
by geographers and non-geographers alike.
Having noted all these, it is anticipated that this research will open up many more angles to 
pursue for full-fledged research at the PhD level.
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Chapter Two
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
The goal of this review is to provide the theoretical and methodological foundation for what is 
fundamentally a discursive interrogation of the critical role of subjectivity and victimhood in the 
operations of the TRC. It will present a framework for understanding the positioning of subjects 
as victims in a broader discourse that aimed at a new, post-Apartheid imaginary through 
national reconciliation but also effectively overlapped with the logic of positioning. I first 
address recent literature on the TRC and its links with ideas about victimhood. I then review 
key literature -  across various disciplines -  on discourse theory and subjectivity, highlighting 
germane points. By focusing on this body of literature, I believe it is possible to show how the 
TRC operated within an overlapping set of discourses associated with practices of subject- 
positioning. The final section presents some concluding thoughts.
2.2 Studies of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The truth and reconciliation process in South African has spawned various academic and non- 
academic analyses, involving themes that reflect to a great extent on the moral, political and 
conceptual dimensions of truth commission work, including issues of truth, reconciliation, 
justice, forgiveness, amnesty, political transition and nation-building (for example, Wilson, 
2001; Hayner, 2002; Castillejo-Cuellar, 2007). Commentators on the TRC process stress the 
fact that the Commission operated to a large extent within the parameters of international
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human rights norms (e.g. Humphrey, 2003) and through these norms aimed to build a new 
South Africa where reconciliation was a reality. In Shattered Voices Teresa Godwin Phelps 
examines the work of the TRC from the point of view of victims, clearly stressing the personal 
aspects of the process in all its complexity as well as the Commission’s emphasis on 
storytelling (Phelps, 2004). However, she does not pursue other important, if complexifying, 
lines of thought: that stories emanated from within a discursive structure and that in telling their 
stories individuals were encouraged to operate from the subject-position of “victim”. For some 
commentators (e.g. Humphrey, 2002), one contentious aspect of post-atrocity testimony is the 
state's attempt to “fix” and reinforce memory in a particular way -  at least in terms of state 
rebuilding. Humphrey (2005) deepens the argument by drawing attention to the relationship 
between the victim, the state and reconciliation. Reconciliation in the TRC, he states, was 
conceptualized by making victims pivotal in the state’s quest for national reconstruction and 
reconciliation. He points to the fact that while this process was aimed at “redeeming” victims it 
nevertheless began by “producing” victims. Fiona Ross, too, argues that as a state-sponsored 
commission of inquiry, the TRC was characterized by pragmatic rationalities for dealing with 
the past such that the “truth” was produced and managed, not simply acknowledged. Victims’ 
narratives of the past were controlled by the political strategies and goals of the political actors 
and the objective of reconciliation, notwithstanding the fact that complexities became overly 
simplified (Ross, 2003a,b).
The discourse surrounding victimhood in the TRC has been an organizing trope motivating 
new forms of practice designed to manage a category of identity within a multimodal social 
field -  consisting of “victims”, human rights experts, psychologists, psychiatrists, legal 
practitioners, activists and the clergy (Humphrey, 2003). As subsequent parts of this review 
make clear, the discourse of victimhood is at once powerful, persuasive and seductive, 
amenable to political agendas, and has ontological effects at the level of subjectivity. In the
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TRC discourse, victimhood took shape through a focus on victims as important characters in 
the process of reconciliation. Stephane Leman-Langlois’s work captures this process: “victims 
were called upon to be willing participants in the process, it was a ‘positive’ power of seduction, 
recruitment, in which victims were invited to realize that their logical benefit lied [sic] in 
participation” (Leman-Langlois, 2000:150; original emphasis). Jaber Gubrium and James 
Holstein’s Foucauldian conceptualization of the way discourse constructs subjectivity in the 
context of social institutions more generally is useful here for it specifies and locates a 
particular framing of identity. For Gubrium and Holstein, institutions produce “institutional 
identities” -  characterized by “locally salient images, models, or templates for self-construction” 
(Gubrium & Holstein, 2001:11) -  which, on the one hand, serve to structure and attune the 
individual to a particular subjectivity (in the service of an institution) and, on the other, construct 
a picture of reality. Indeed, the “institutional identities” that Gubrium and Holstein describe 
become particularly relevant in the context of troubled identities, such as that of “victim”, where 
such identities enable a particular way for the victim to behave and how she is to be perceived 
and represented (cf. Aretxaga, 1997; Loseke, 2003).
In large part, then, as an organizing and institutional system the TRC discourse was 
constructed through the logics and vocabularies of victimhood -  in conjunction with the stories 
of victims. Victimhood, as Laura Jeffery and Matei Candea have put it, “establishes a space for 
a specific kind of politics; but it clears the ground, it poses itself as the neutral or indisputable 
starting point from which discussion, debates, and action -  in a word, politics -  can and must 
proceed” (Jeffery & Candea, 2006:289). This is a point similarly pursued by Statman (2000) 
and Verdoolaege (2006). In his analysis of the South African reconciliation paradigm, Richard 
Wilson’s work underscores the construction of victimhood and links it to nation rebuilding. For 
him, what the TRC succeeded in doing was to construct a new identity, that of the “national 
victim”. The suffering of individual victims under Apartheid, he argues, was brought into a
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public space for the purpose of constructing a new national imaginary. “At ritualized HRV 
[Human Rights Violations] hearings, suffering was lifted out of the mundane world of 
individuals and their profane everyday pain and made sacred in order to construct a new 
national collective conscience” (Wilson, 2000:80).
Michael Humphrey’s analysis in The Politics of Atrocity and Reconciliation is also significant 
here. Humphrey brings an important point to the fore in his theoretical intervention, arguing 
that “victims” of atrocities, such as were the focus of truth commissions such as the TRC, were 
centred upon to, among other things, construct new nations and “consolidate state power” 
(Humphrey, 2002:10). Alongside, he offers a clear perspective on the manner in which victims 
were conditioned to participate in a larger political project of nation rebuilding, one in which 
individuals were constructed as victims -  through the process whereby they told the “truth” of 
their experiences. In this context, and as Humphrey (2002) is keen to stress in work that 
highlights the relationship between testimony and corollaries such as political power and 
victimhood, testifying not only represents experiences of victimization, it also takes part in the 
formation of subjectivities wherein one takes up the identity of victim or perpetrator.
Building on these studies, there is scope for critically examining the role of “discourse” in order 
to situate the complex workings of the TRC’s experiment in “national reconciliation” in a wider 
analytical frame that takes the construction and mobilization of positions into consideration. 
Indeed, within the substantial body of literature related to the TRC, analyses have not 
necessarily given consideration to or have been somewhat underdeveloped with respect to the 
discursive terrain of national reconciliation. The language of many studies convey particular 
assumptions about what counts as knowledge, and are often aligned to particular -  uncritical -  
visions of reality. The TRC process is taken far too much at face value, with the focus of the 
knowledges around them being simply descriptive or prescriptive. Objects of study are reduced
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to their evident factors (such as human rights, atrocity, etc) and not placed in a wider context -  
how meanings, discourses, positions and identities are constructed, defining not only ways of 
“seeing” but what is seen and what can be said. Given these failings, these studies certainly 
cannot point to the fact that it is instructive to think of truth and reconciliation particularly as a 
set of discourses -  united in some aspects but contending in some others -  and that they bring 
to the fore the question of the role of authority figures in managing human well-being through 
various discourses running parallel to the circulation of power. These discourses are not simply 
about “truth” and “reconciliation” in an ordinary sense, even though these are important; they 
are also about issues such as human rights, social transformation, the capacities of state 
agencies and expert knowledge and the participation of individuals, groups and communities. 
This is so because the South African reconciliatory framework is not exhausted by the study of 
truth and reconciliation as a neutral discourse or practice. It is this awareness of the fact that 
there is more to the TRC than meets the eye that the discourse theory literature can help to 
address, especially as I work with the knowledges and practices clustered around the 
discourse of victimhood and the participative capacities of victims.
2.3 Discourse theory
Although the TRC literature offers rich insights into the workings of truth and reconciliation as 
mediated by the logic of victimization, it provides relatively little help when it comes to 
understanding how discourses become mobilized and appropriated within the context of the 
hearings. The discourse theory tradition, on the other hand, has much to offer and it will prove 
most useful for interpreting the empirical data.
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Discourse points to a “reality” that we, as subjects, only have limited influence upon, shrouded 
as it is in ideas, norms and rationalities that govern what is in fact sayable and by whom 
(Parker, 1992; Hall, 2001). This is as a result of the fact that such discourses are at once 
constitutive and constituting, constructing, amongst others, process, organizational structure, 
subject-positions and systems of knowledge as well as governing action within any given 
arena (Fairclough, 1992; Rose, 1999). Crucially, discourses construct representations of the 
social world and situate subjects within them. In his important book Language and Symbolic 
Power, Pierre Bourdieu presents an interesting view of discourse. He regards it as diffusing 
through the linguistic (language), extending into cognitive and corporeal realms, to alter the 
way individuals think of themselves and how they relate to dominant visions of the world. Even 
more, discourses according to Bourdieu are defined by and embedded into symbolic power 
structures that define relations in wider society (for instance, economic and political relations of 
domination), and so any conception of discourse must also take into account not only power 
politics but the various institutionalities -  structures, institutions, authorities and activities -  that 
govern what can be said and by whom (Bourdieu, 1991:1-31).
In their germinal work, Discourse and Social Psychology Jonathan Potter and Margaret 
Wetherell point out that all discourses are tainted by ideological and political motivations and 
thus privilege certain interpretations of the ontological world (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). As with 
work done within critical psychology emphasizing poststructuralist approaches, theirs is an 
attempt to challenge the idea of the fully self-conscious, self-directed individual (also Stainton 
Rogers et al, 1995). In what is representative of the genre, Michael Billig points out: when 
individuals speak “they do not create their own language, b u t... use terms which are culturally, 
historically and ideologically available” (Billig, 2001:217). This is because discourses produce 
the very thing they intend to illuminate, constructing reality and experience in concrete and 
material ways (Foucault, 2002). Thus the label of “victim” comes with a manifestly typical
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experience and expectations -  depending, of course, on who or what the label has come to 
mean in a particular time and place. This is because the effects that a discourse is able to 
provoke and the ways that thought and action are shaped and governed by words “function in 
connection with other things”; that is, “what it makes possible, the surfaces, networks and 
circuits around which it flows, the artifacts and passions that it mobilizes and through which it 
mobilizes” (Rose, 1999:29-30).
What discourse theory (especially of the Foucauldian variety) stresses is that discourses do 
more than designate things; a discourse does not merely describe an action or thought. For 
Foucault, discourse is creative, constructing specific aspects of reality. A discourse is 
constructive in that it “finds a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of 
giving it the status of an object -  and therefore of making it manifest, nameable, and 
describable” (Foucault, 2002:46). In invoking the term “discourse” Foucault is interested in two 
things. Firstly, those sets of statements that recur in talk and texts of all kinds and in different 
historical periods, and secondly, contexts, those locations where they take on different 
connotations and configurations (Foucault, 2002:89-98). For Foucault discourses of any kind -  
whether economic, biomedical, psychiatric, psychological religious -  are historically specific, 
regulated systems of statements that both construct and regulate knowledge and social 
practices of various forms. Discourses do not refer to a single, all-encompassing state or 
condition but represent the existing knowledge about a particular theme, object or subject at a 
specific historical juncture (Hall, 2001). Yet, as much as discourses are powerful and exerting, 
they are always fragmented, limited and provisional, laden with “gaps, voids, absences, limits, 
divisions” (Foucault, 2002:134).
For Foucault, the significance of a discourse is linked to its truth-claiming quality -  the fact that 
it professes to describe reality authoritatively and objectively. As truth claims, therefore,
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discourses are not neutral but imbricated with power. Put differently, the power to define is the 
outcome of a discourse so that discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power. 
Following Foucault, Stuart Hall builds on the case of discourses such as “madness” to suggest 
that a discourse only exists meaningfully within the often plethoric discourses about it. “The 
concept of discourse”, he reasons, “is not about whether things exist but about where meaning 
comes from” (Hall, 2001:73). This is because a discourse is not a closed system; rather, it 
draws on elements from other discourses and translates them into its network of meaning 
whilst foreclosing other ways of thinking about the topic (Hall, 2001). Also building on Foucault, 
Gillian Rose brings a useful current of meaning to her definition of discourse. For her, it “refers 
to groups of statements which structure the way a thing is thought, and the way we act on the 
basis of that thinking. In other words, discourse is a particular knowledge about the world 
which shapes how the world is understood and how things are done within it” (G. Rose, 
2007:142; emphasis added). Subjects, for instance, are located within specific discourses 
(Edley, 2001) and are produced by them. Furthermore, discourses determine the way we see 
and talk about the position and subjectivity of the subject.
Notwithstanding its usefulness, the whole idea of discourse, with its focus on discursive 
strategies, does underestimate the complex nature of human agency. Agency is 
disempowered in the face of stable strategies of discourse, which leave unexplained questions 
of how individuals exercise their powers of action. While this question does not fall within the 
scope of the present study, it might be useful to broaden the theoretical terrain by asking if it is 
possible for discursive strategies to be taken up in countervailing terms and used strategically 
by the subjects being constructed and positioned. One could argue that storytelling, the kind 
promoted at the TRC, provided an important mechanism for victims to lay claim to discourse 
and their subjectivity for acts of resistance/subversion/transformation. In this sense, then, a
25
relevant question would be: how do subjects make use of the sites, strategies and discourse of 
victimhood and participation to serve their own ends?
2.4 Subjectivity and Subject-positioning
Subjectification for the Foucauldian is not solely about domination or subordination but about 
the processes of being constructed as a certain type of subject. For Foucauldian thinkers like 
Nikolas Rose subjectivity refers to self as expressed through discourse, to the extent that 
discourses are understood by focusing on how ways of “talking” about an issue locate selves 
in particular historical and institutional contexts (Rose, 1996a). More broadly, subjectivity is 
“the condition of being a subject, dynamic and multiple, always positioned in relation to 
particular discourses and practices and produced by these -  the condition of being a subject” 
(Henriques et al, 1984:3). It is the case that individuals will at any time be simultaneously 
located in a number of different discourses. Yet, these positions may be contradictory, allowing 
for individual agency in accounting for self or experience -  often in resistance terms.
Underpinning the interpretation of subjectivity are two main theoretical strands. In the 
humanistic and phenomenological tradition subjectivity is based on conscious, autonomous 
self-definition whereby the subject is a given, a fixed empirical reality as well as the source and 
centre of experience (Wetherell, 1994). In the critical anti-humanist vein, subjectivity emerges 
as being both constitutive and constituted and bringing together the role of positioning: 
subjects are positioned within a “discursive complex” and so experience themselves in the way 
required by that complex (Parker, 1994; also Hollway, 1984). By problematizing and 
complexifying the very notion of the subject, “criticalists” generally examine the powerful 
effects of discourse, especially the positioning of subjects and the role of discursive formations
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in constituting worlds and fields of intelligibility. Therefore they pose a serious challenge to 
traditional assumptions about the “nature” of subjectivity (Henriques et al, 1984). Within a 
critical orientation, the subject is variously presented as constituted and given to 
materialization within discourse (e.g. Parker, 1994; Rose, 1996b) but in many situations also 
identifiable as an active discourse user capable of resisting or disturbing dominant discourses 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Indeed, from the perspective of governmentality subjectivity 
emerges as discursively constituted, and discourses “are embodied within complex technical 
and practical associations and devices that provide ‘places’ that human beings must occupy if 
they are to have the status of subjects of particular sorts” (Rose, 1996b:53).
Because subjectivity is a process that takes form in a specific historical, cultural and 
sociopolitical context, it is for the most part influenced by discourses circulating in the social 
fields where the subject is situated (Foucault, 1988; Weedon, 1997). Whether it is played out in 
families, prisons, schools, asylums, workplaces or truth commission hearings, subjectivity is 
characterized by the discursive and institutional positions from which subjects act, the 
discourses that shape patterns of talk and through which individuals experience and make 
sense of themselves as subjects (Wetherell et al, 2001; Frosh et al, 2003). For Foucault 
(2002), subject-positions are foundational to the whole idea of subjectivity. Clearly, his take on 
subjectivity is situated in the context of power. This power is saturated, for one, in the 
discourse speakers draw upon to represent themselves and in doing so create and/or position 
a particular “other” -  whether this be a madman, a hysterical woman, or a victim (see also Hall, 
2001, Willig, 2001). This discourse, in the first instance, delineates the parameters for what 
can be thought, said or done. And in this way discourses have “real” effects on the 
subjects/subjectivities they describe. Through any set of discourses, individuals not only come 
to occupy spaces of subjecthood but also come to know and operate within it. As Carla Willig 
further explains, discourses “offer subject positions, which, when taken up have implications
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for subjectivity and experience” (Willig, 2001:107). More specifically, subject-positions can be 
said to be relatively end products of discourses which “construct subjects as well as objects 
and, as a result, make available positions within networks of meaning that speakers can take 
up” (Willig, 2001:110). Drawing from biomedical discourse, Willig uses the example of 
individuals who, when they experience ill-health, automatically take up the subject-position of 
“patient” which is made available through the discourse and categorizes them as the recipient 
of expert help. The idea of “positioning” therefore offers insight to the relationship between 
discourse and subjectivity (Hollway, 1984), and makes it possible to begin to track the linkages 
they both have with technologies and power.
Positioning theory assumes the person as occupier of subject-positions within discourses as 
well as within time and space, and so it offers a distinct analytic for exploring how these 
positions are located within the wider norms of social life (Edley, 2001; Burr, 2002). It builds on 
a well-established tradition in social psychology that links narrative with identity and interaction. 
Central to the theory is the view that talk, as a category of expression, reflects discourses that 
are prevalent (and pre-exist) in the broader social environment. The concept of subject- 
positioning connects meaning-making (for instance, interpretative repertoires) to the social 
construction and positioning of selves (Edley, 2001). For positioning to occur, individuals must 
draw on specific discourses, often in a particular context and to support a specific objective. 
For example, a government, organization or authority figure may draw on a humanitarian 
discourse to position certain individuals as “victims” -  thus needing help -  and, by virtue of 
this, position themselves as humane, responsible or ethical. This discourse can then be 
expected to have effects on the way victimhood is conceptualized and understood. Hollway 
(1984) used the positioning concept as an analytic device to identify the ways in which 
individuals are situated or positioned within or around the discursive tropes of male sexuality. 
The act of positioning is discursive in that it refers to the assignment of “role” to subjects in a
28
particular line of discourse such that the social meaning of what is said contributes to the 
construction of the position of the individual. Since positioning is subjectivizing it is in many 
ways connected to the entire means by which power is localized through discourse.
While the Foucauldian idea that subjectivity is a product of positioning in discourses is now 
often regarded as de rigueur in contemporary social science, there is still room “to address the 
issue of how discursive positions are occupied by subjects” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000:136). A 
consequence of addressing this might be to see positions as productive of discourses (and 
institutions). For example, the discourse available to the subject-position of “victim” is 
completely different from the discourse that accompanies the subject-position of “perpetrator”. 
Similarly, the psychic and social spaces available to both subject-positions are different. Thus 
it would appear that in being situated within a particular subject-position, the individual is 
obliged to limit her/himself to that the “discursive repertoires” associated with that position 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987) -  reinforcing the very logics grounding that subject-position in the 
first place.
Hollway describes individuals’ subjectivities as “the product of their history of positioning in 
discourses” (Hollway, 1984:228). She explores the links between positioning and discourse, 
particularly how subjectivity is constituted through the gender differentiated positions in 
discourses pertaining to sex and heterosexual relations. Her definition of discourse is 
instructive: “A set of assumptions which cohere around a common logic and which confer 
particular meanings in the experience and practices of people in a particular sphere” (Hollway, 
1984:63). There are two dimensions to Hollway’s overall argument. One, identifying and 
describing sexuality discourses and exploring the subject-positions these discourses make 
available to individual men and women. And, two, investigating the extent to which men and 
women take up particular subject-positions in relation to these discourses. Because the social
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discourses surrounding male sexuality regard it as being characterized by “compelling” and 
“uncontrollable” sexual impulses -  what Hollway (1989) terms the male sexual drive discourse 
-  it is thus socially acceptable. Constructing male sexuality as driven by a powerful biological 
imperative, this discourse creates the trajectory for what is an appropriate and intelligible 
performance of masculinity. From a feminist logic, Hollway (1989) argues that the male 
sexuality discourses -  as “scripts” -  are framed by predominantly male heterosexual 
perspectives, and they shape the ways men and women in different social and cultural 
positions experience sexuality. Apart from this, these discourses are therefore responsible for 
creating structural inequalities between men and women, constructing male sexuality in a 
particular way -  as superior and overriding. Hollway’s work is centrally Foucauldian in that it 
begins with the premise that subject-positions are assemblages of thought, and that 
discourses basically structure the psychic and social spaces within which individuals act. But it 
also draws on psychoanalysis and feminist theory, thus going beyond Foucault’s interests in 
discursive changes over time in order to highlight the struggles between discourses and how 
subjects engage with or resist a given discourse at a particular time. Applying the 
psychoanalytic concepts of signification and defence mechanisms, Hollway argues that a 
discourse not only produces a particularistic set of meanings, it suppresses others. It can 
suppress, for instance, the subject’s ability to resist these meanings or at least contend with 
them.
Harre’s positioning theory has been developed as an alternative interpretive tool for the 
investigation of discursive acts and to that end it has been variously articulated, refined and 
applied (e.g., Harre & van Langenhove, 1999; Linehan & McCarthy, 2000). Two kinds of 
positioning are outlined by Harre -  “interactive” and “reflexive”. “There can be interactive 
positioning in which what one person says positions another. And there can be reflexive 
positioning in which one positions oneself (Davies & Harre, 1999:37). Both kinds are relevant
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in the case of the TRC, although the former is pertinent to my analysis. Indeed, Harre’s 
perspective on positioning offers a useful vocabulary for exploring the process by which a 
“position” -  relative to another one -  serves to explain the meanings of actions expressed 
through it. This vocabulary underscores the process by which “roles” are assigned to 
participants (or speakers) within the frame of a particular discourse so that what is -  or can be 
-sa id  depends upon the position of the participant (Harre & van Langenhove, 1999). From this 
perspective, positioning involves an engagement with discourse -  in this case, statements -  so 
as to position oneself within sets of interrelated rights, duties and obligations as determined by 
its conventions and expectations. By accepting a position, a participant conforms to the 
prevailing norms that underpin a discourse. In the same way, by refusing a position the 
participant challenges those norms. For Harre, positioning is a way of being in the world. And 
in this schema, Harre includes relations of power, knowledge, dominance, resistance, 
submission and so forth. Yet, it is noteworthy that while positioning theory recognizes the 
power of discourse it also affords dynamism. Thus, participants positioned within a discourse 
have the opportunity to exercise some degree of choice-making, and also have the capacity to 
hold multiple positions (Davies & Harre, 1999), with the ability to reflect upon these various 
positions and the potential to produce different positions amenable to different purposes and 
occasions (Howie & Peters, 1996).
2.5 Conclusion
The chapter began with an overview of the literature on the TRC. It also looked at the 
theoretical literature on discourse theory and subjectivity/subject-positioning. It discussed this 
body of work with the objective of examining how the discourse of victimhood and subjectivity 
can be theorized in relation to the South African truth and reconciliation process. At the same
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time it cast a critical view on normative understandings and effects of discourse and how this 
produces a specific knowledge of victimhood which not only categorizes and calibrates the 
subject of victimization -  the victim -  as nor self-evident but renders her visible and cognizable 
in the public domain -  that is, in the space of testimony. The discourse of victimhood, as this 
study will demonstrate, works through heavily psychologized discourses (in conjunction with 
expert knowledges and authority figures) to situate victims in the structures of victimhood, and 
broadly the structures of national reconciliation. This process is initiated not by imposition but 
rather by “encouragement” whereby victims are encouraged to be true to their experiences and 
yet manage their behaviour in terms of delineated markers of victimhood. No doubt, explicating 
the subjectivity and positioning angles of the TRC discourse of victimhood is important 
because it paves the way for a critique regarding extant assumptions about truth, reconciliation 
and the intermediate space of victimhood which encompasses the subject and her position. 
Indeed, when cast in a critical frame, seemingly neutral discourses implied by referencing 
victimhood have a clear positioning effect. In my view it is crucial to pay attention to these 
dynamics, the issue of subject positioning especially as it does open up new ways of 
perceiving the logic of discourse.
The task for the next chapter is to explore how these divergent yet intertwining theoretical 
perspectives can help to answer the research questions.
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Chapter Three 
METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION
3.1 Methodological framing
The previous chapter presented the interrelated concepts of discourse, subjectivity and 
subject-positioning as constituting the theoretical backbone of this research. To achieve the 
aim of this research I shall be using a discursive approach, not least because of the 
possibilities it presents for innovativeness and for answering my research questions. With this 
in mind, a social constructionist methodology featuring Foucauldian discourse analysis has 
been adopted for the purposes of this study, in order to engage with the discourses and 
processes at work in constructing and positioning subjects at the level of the TRC.
This chapter thus situates the study within a qualitative methodological framework that applies 
discourse analysis to secondary data to achieve its purpose. Characteristic to secondary 
analysis is the pursuit of objectives different from the kind that drove the original work or the 
application of specific theoretical or conceptual tools to analysing a pre-existing data set 
(Hinds, Vogel & Clarke-Steffen, 1997; Singleton & Straits, 1999). I shall be using such data for 
this research due to their relatively easy availability, the lower cost of procuring them, the 
possibility of being creative with such data and the minimal ethical risk involved. Because the 
research will be focusing to a great extent on the dimension of language -  that is, the 
discursive domain -  in the hearings of the TRC, my focus basically is on discourse-analysing a 
small set of documents, supported by the referencing of academic publications in order to 
situate the study within a wider sociopolitical context.
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In this study, then, I shall interpret discourse by analysing it mainly at the textual level. There 
are two main approaches to textually oriented discourse analysis; based on whether one 
conceptualizes discourses as primarily manifest in the utterances of actors (politicians or 
policy-makers, for instance) or whether one sees official documents, such as acts, committee 
papers, reports, legislation and speeches, as the manifestation of discourses. Discourses are 
broadly understood to be manifested not just in official documents, but also in institutional 
practices and discursive events of the TRC hearings. The term “discourse” is used here in the 
Foucauldian sense, meaning a “group of statements that belong to a single system of 
formation” (Foucault, 2002:131). Discourses can be understood simultaneously as “ways-of- 
seeing the world” and “ways-of-being in the world” (Willig, 2001:107). This applies as much to 
Foucault’s elaborations on “psychiatric discourses” as it does to victimhood discourses as 
explored here. For the present purposes, I track discourse at the basic level of words but also 
in mindfulness of the broader social activity that unfolds in a particular intersection of space 
and time.
The analysis will proceed in two directions. Firstly, I shall do an analysis of discourses of 
victimhood in the Act and Report of the TRC. Secondly, I also employ discourse analysis 
techniques informed by positioning theory to establish how certain individuals (in this case, 
commissioners of the TRC) position subjects discursively. To go about doing the second part 
of the analysis, I have found the idea of discursive repertoire4 (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 
Wetherell & Potter, 1988; Edley, 2001) tremendously useful as it helps to highlight the ways 
discourses are organized as well as how they may be used to analyse positioning in testimony 
situations. Following a line prevalent in their pioneering work Discourse and Social Psychology 
(1987), Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter define discursive repertoires as “building 
blocks” of discourse; thus, they enable a micro-level analysis of the effects and function of
4 Also called interpretative repertoire.
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discourse in the construction of particular realities (Wetherell & Potter, 1988:168-172). In his 
discussion about the ways in which masculinities are discursively constructed, Nigel Edley 
points out that “when people talk, they do so using a lexicon or repertoire of terms which has 
been provided for them by history” (Edley, 2001:190). In the context of this research, then, 
discourse analysis is deployed to explicate those repertoires -  what I take to be the “mini­
discourses” that frame victimhood -  that function to place a particular narrative frame around 
particular sets of discourse and thus come to present a particular view of reality through it. 
Following Foucault, I shall interpret these repertoires as enunciations that privilege specific 
ways of seeing and also encourage certain practices, and not focus on hidden meanings of 
any kind. As David Torfing puts it, Foucault “is concerned neither with the truth nor the 
meaning of actual statements, but with their discursive conditions of possibility. Hence, he 
draws our attention to the ‘rules of formation’ that regulate what can be said, how it can be 
said, who can speak and in which name, and what kind of strategies ... can be realized at the 
level of discourse” (Torfing, 2005:7). Of course, such discourses are not autonomous systems 
but operate in the context of the institutional mechanisms, practices and supports they are 
grounded in.
In keeping with the aims of this study, I am mindful of the fact that the validity of discourse 
analysis cannot be measured in terms of breadth or “depth” of any kind but in terms of quality. 
“What matters”, Fran Tomkiss suggests, “is the richness of textual detail, rather than the 
number of texts analysed” (Tomkiss, 1998:253).
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3.2 Data Sources
Background literature
In this study, I set out on a long journey to identify relevant literature to frame as well as inform 
the research. The selection of textual sources was based upon their usefulness and 
appropriateness to the context of the South African TRC. This was done across a wide array of 
fields, including but not limited to (critical) social psychology, philosophy, sociology, truth and 
reconciliation studies and human geography. As I engaged with various journal articles and 
books, what was critical was the ability to judge a text’s potential contribution -  directly or 
indirectly -  to the study. To this end, the themes of subjectivity, subject-positioning and 
discourse, wherever they occurred, were isolated into a conceptual and methodological 
register that applied to or could be applied to the TRC, and appropriated accordingly.
Empirical analysis
For the empirical aspect of this project I analyse three main texts. The first text is the 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 35 of 1994, especially the section that 
constructs and frames victimhood. My analysis will be further informed by the examination of 
two other texts in examining the function of statements from TRC commissioners constructing 
and framing victimhood in terms of specific discursive repertoires: samples from the TRC 
Report and transcripts of the hearings. These documents have been made available on the 
Commission’s website and in other published and unpublished accounts. I will analyse these 
texts as far as they relate to the discourse of victimhood and as they relate to the stated
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objectives of the TRC. This would require a focus on the theme of “victim” in conjunction with 
the discourses surrounding it and how these manifest in the documents in view.
3.3 Sampling and Representation
In discourse analysis, as with much of qualitative analysis, the notion of statistical sampling is 
generally not the norm. The choice of cases is guided rather by theory, purpose, relevance and 
the researcher’s interests and understanding of the phenomena under investigation (Patton, 
2002). For this reason, I apply purposive sampling in my selection of representative cases. 
Purposive sampling offers in-depth access to “information-rich cases”, defined as “those from 
which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the 
research, thus the term purposeful sampling” (Patton, 2002:46). This is a different strategy to 
that of statistical sampling which is concerned mainly with producing generalize-able, unbiased 
and “objective” data. For the purposes of this dissertation, five testimony transcripts that I 
considered representative formed the core of the discussion in the section on discursive 
repertoires (Appendix C). I focused intensively on this selection for my analysis.
3.4 Practical Preparations and Collection of Data
In my analysis I followed Gillian Rose in her prescriptions for doing discourse analysis. She 
offers a number of strategies for analysing discourse (G. Rose, 2007:141-171):
1. Looking at sources with fresh eyes
2. Immersing oneself in those sources
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3. Identifying central themes in the sources
4. Examining the truth effects of those themes
5. Being attuned to complexity as well as contradictions
6. Looking for the invisible and the visible in texts
7. Being attentive to details
I largely went through these seven steps in order to gain access to “meaningful clusters of 
words and images” (G. Rose, 2007:157) as well as general tendencies and similarities offering 
insight into the construction of subjects and their positioning thereof. Selected sections of the 
Act and TRC Report as well as the testimony transcripts were read through in their entirety and 
then thematic categories -  “discursive repertoires” -  were noted. Extracts seen as related to 
each category were engaged with through numerous readings and re-readings, often with a 
different outlook5. There were times when all I sought was a general feel for the material and 
there were times when I was more interested in isolating specific repertoires used by the 
commissioners in their talk. Analysis, however, focuses on the discursive repertoires that are 
used to construct and position subjects within the discourse of victimhood. These repertoires 
are explored with a view to tracing their foundations, the subject-positions of victim they make 
possible and the discursive tools used in building them.
3.5 Ethical Considerations
The issue of ethics in social research raises a lot of anxiety. This has been discussed by many 
authors (e.g. Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; David & Sutton, 2004). Greater ethical concerns demand 
that researchers be more cautious and at the same time be ethically responsible in the
5 Further details about the process of selecting and analysing the transcripts is provided in Appendix B.
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appropriation of data related to human subjects. This is so because of the risk of exposing 
sensitive aspects of individuals’ lives. The ethical problematic is particularly evident in 
discursive-narrative research where knowledge is generated through talk within a particular 
socio-cultural, political and historical context. Even when it deals with human subjects 
indirectly, qualitative research is inescapably influenced by the epistemological commitments 
and preconceptions of the researcher and thus the findings it presents must be taken as 
interpretive -  firm but not the final word.
Through contact with the Chair of the University’s Ethics Committee, I was careful to explain 
the nature of my research and to specify the purpose of the study. It was confirmed that ethical 
approval was not needed for this research since the data employed are public domain 
material. Indeed, the use of secondary data affords the opportunity to use information without 
trampling on sensitive issues, a situation often associated with direct contact. But even in my 
use of published or publicly available material I still had to make my own judgments about what 
could be presented or excluded.
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Chapter Four
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
Thus far, I have explored how systems of knowledge manifest through discourse and also give 
shape to subjectivity and subject-positioning -  in the context of the TRC hearings. I have also 
drawn attention to the role the discourse of participation played in the light of the storytelling 
framework of the Human Rights Violations Committee (HRVC) arm of the TRC and signposted 
the issue of victimhood as discursively constructed in the Commission. In this chapter I look at 
the realm of the subject, specifically the subjectivity that is cultivated in the official documents 
of the TRC. To accomplish this and in addition illustrate the theoretical argument in more 
concrete terms, I also look briefly at the discursive articulation of the importance of 
participation in inciting individuals to come forward to give testimony. Finally, I look at two 
repertoires that animate that animated the theme of victimhood in the hearings: the voice of the 
nation and the voice of empathy.
4.2 Data analysis
Constructing victimhood
At the centre of the work of the HRVC was a shared discourse of victimhood -  a major 
psychological discourse in post-Apartheid South Africa which quickly became appropriated 
within the political narrative of reconciliation. This discourse arose from the construction of
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victimhood in the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 35 of 1994 and the 
Commission’s Report.
A useful start to the discussion of the discourse of victimhood in the text of the Act is the 
etymology of the word “victim” -  exactly as it occurs within the document. Whilst the specific 
objective for the Act behind the term victim, rather than, say, “wronged person” or “survivor”, 
was to place a category of people -  “victims, and not perpetrators” -  as the “beginning, the 
focus and the central point of the legislation” (Krog, 1998:5), the etymology of the word belies a 
broader discourse of victimhood. According to The Chambers Dictionary the word “victim” has 
its origins in the Latin word victima which describes the creature offered in sacrifice as well as 
one who has been subjected to torture or some other form of bodily harm (The Chambers 
Dictionary, 1998 ed., s.v. “Victim”). Broadly speaking, the word has a negative, agency- 
weakening ring to it and can be said to fix individuals in a specific subjectivity or position. But it 
does have a do-ing function. Albeit in a different context Foucault puts it quite aptly: “people 
know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don’t know 
is what what they do does” (cited in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983:187). Following this reason, 
“physical things exist, but they only take on meaning and become objects of knowledge within 
... discourse” (Hall, 2001:73). As Fiona Ross argues about the subject-position that resulted 
from the prescriptions of the Act, “The resultant legal person, the “victim”, produced through 
occupation of the signs of injury, has a different relationship to the state and legal systems 
from other citizens” (Ross, 2003a: 12). In the case of the TRC this is reinforced because as she 
is positioned within the discourse she is also drawn into the national project of reconciliation 
and healing. As Basia Spalek has argued, the definition of the term “victim” not only denotes a 
passive or helpless individual but involves stereotypes that can end up oversimplifying the 
complex realities surrounding that very definition (Spalek, 2006).
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In this sense, the subject created by the TRC was of a generic victim tortured or otherwise 
bearing traces of suffering. Section 1 of the Act defines the term “victim” in a broad sense: a 
person who suffered physically, mentally, emotionally or financially either because of a gross 
violation of human rights or as a result of certain acts associated with political objectives. The 
definition also included individuals who intervened on behalf of such a person and it allowed 
relatives and dependants of victims to be included as well (Appendix A).
The discourse of victimhood was also defined by its place within a discourse of participation 
which was circumscribed sociopolitically by the larger goal of truth and reconciliation. This 
victimhood discourse gained forcefulness in the sites of its operation and in relation to the 
commissioners who, because of their position as authority figures, spoke from a position of 
power. The politics of participation thus worked along with the discourse of victimhood: for the 
subject of Apartheid-era atrocities to be helped, she must participate. And for her to participate 
she must be named, represented, given an identity -  the subject-position of victim. From the 
perspective of the TRC, giving identity as victim was in many ways an attempt to offer the self 
a “horizon from which to take a stand” (Taylor, 1989:27) more actively (see Tutu, 1999:87). 
Hence within this frame, the logic of participation was essential:
the Commission’s quest for truth should be viewed as a contribution to a much longer- 
term goal and vision. Its purpose in attempting to uncover the past had nothing to do 
with vengeance; it had to do, rather, with helping victims to become more visible and 
more valuable citizens through the public recognition and official acknowledgement of 
their experiences (TRC Final Report 2003, Volume One:110).
Carefully read, one can see that the Commission’s Report also produced subjects of 
victimization:
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Victims are acted upon rather than acting, suffering rather than surviving ... [W]hen 
dealing with gross human rights violations committed by perpetrators, the person 
against whom that violation is committed can only be described as a victim, regardless 
of whether he or she emerged as a survivor (TRC Final Report 2003, Volume One:59).
In the work of the TRC, the victim was basically categorized as being someone who had 
suffered “severe ill treatment”. Indeed, according to the Report: “[T]he Commission resolved 
that its mandate was to give attention to human rights violations committed as specific acts, 
resulting in severe physical and/or mental injury, in the course of past political conflict” (TRC 
Final Report 2003, Volume One:64).
Making participation matter
It is noteworthy that the TRC’s operation was marked by populist pleas for victims to come 
forward to tell their stories and thus participate with government towards the realization of 
“common” goals. This, however, required that subjects “recognise themselves as part of a 
public” (Miller, 1993:xxi). This way, individuals functioned not merely as subjects but as 
citizens as well. In the context of South Africa, it is through this public participatory discourse -  
emphasizing the need for “bottom-up” involvement by lay citizens -  that the interests of 
subjects become conjoined with more citizenship-centric interests. Indeed, it is through this 
logic, deployed and translated into a range of settings, that subjects are positioned within the 
rubric of an imagined community whose hopes and aspirations are shaped at a distance 
(Anderson, 1991; Rose, 1999). It is also the case that through the storytelling paradigm the 
Commission’s overall methodological approach to human rights violations inquiry contained a
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discursive articulation of participation. In other words, the logic of inviting people to give 
testimony is in itself a reflection of a broader discourse on participation:
By telling their stories, both victims and perpetrators gave meaning to the multilayered 
experiences of the South African story ... In the (South) African context, where value 
continues to be attached to oral tradition, the process of story telling was particularly 
important. Indeed, this aspect is a distinctive and unique feature of the legislation 
governing the Commission ... The Act explicitly recognised the healing potential of 
telling stories’ (TRC Final Report 2003, Volume One: 115).
Individuals were invited to share their experiences of atrocity through “storytelling” -  stories 
that would be their contribution to building the new South Africa. As the excerpt above shows, 
storytelling was foundational to the TRC methodology. It unfolded in the interactive space 
involving victim and commissioner. Storytelling was also, in Foucauldian terms at least, a 
subjectifying act because it involved a moral obligation to come forward to talk. 
Subjectification, Foucault was quick to point out, is all about “how people are invited or incited 
to recognize their moral obligations” (Foucault, 1997:263). It was at the HRVC hearings that 
victims were given such a space to carry out this obligation. The hearings were semi-formal in 
nature and victims spoke for an average time of thirty minutes. However, much could be said 
about the fact that victims’ narratives were prompted or guided by commissioners. In fact, 
commissioners often gave preparatory talks before, during or after each person’s narrative 
began and could ask questions during the time. The implication here is that as authority figures 
the commissioners’ enabling role led to the creation of a certain mindset by the people they 
engaged with, a view that comes across strongly when examined in Bourdieusian terms. 
Bourdieu describes how agents of the state are endowed with resources and competencies so 
that any utterance -  along with particular terms of address, metaphors etc. -  can be very
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powerful because it draws upon “symbolic capital” that emanates from the social order 
(Bourdieu, 1991:75-76, 1994:8-12). These utterances form an important part of the analysis 
which follows.
Two repertoires of victimhood
Two main repertoires form the basis of the analysis carried out in this section: the voice of the 
nation and the voice of empathy. The discourses the repertoires draw upon are multiple and 
sometimes overlap. The repertoires identified here emerge from comments and statements of 
the commissioners, which organize the discourse of victimhood into blocks of narrative, 
guiding or punctuating individuals’ talk about their experiences of victimization and performing 
a positioning function at the same time. This positioning is cultivated as part and parcel of the 
activities of the act of giving testimony and is a subtle provocation and invitation to talk, not an 
injunction from on high. Indeed, on the one hand, these statements are welcoming, thankful, 
eliciting sympathy, and so on. On the other hand, though, they express the seriousness of 
themes such as nationhood, the experience of victimization, participation, storytelling, and so 
forth.
While the original context of the material I analyse is interactive (that is, between the victims, 
the commissioners and to some extent the wider audience), for the purpose of this study 
attention is paid to the commissioners’ talk, since this presents the linguistic-discursive framing 
in which subjects were positioned.
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1. The voice of the nation
In this repertoire nationhood is evoked to position victims and victimhood within a discourse of 
national reconciliation. Furthermore, victims are deemed to have a “voice”. Thus, they can 
assume a “vital role” by coming forward to tell their stories, to the end that they would become 
healed of their sufferings. This message, importantly, carries with it currents of a vocabulary of 
participation. And it is exercised through a broad discursive frame of public involvement. This 
has implications for discourse as it takes effect through the subject’s (free) will and rationality. 
Hence, it is not channelled in a heavy-handed sense.
In order to bring to the fore a clear sense of how this repertoire works in practice, I would now 
look at excerpts from testimony sessions of the TRC.
Extract 1 
Commissioner Desmond Tutu
I greet you today. We welcome you with warm hearts at this fourth meeting of the 
commission, of the Truth and Conciliation...
We do want to express our deepest sympathy to those who are suffering as a result of 
the ongoing violence in this province, and express our distress that violence seems to 
be endemic in these parts. We hope that work of the Commission may make some kind 
of contribution to the ending of violence, and to the promotion of reconciliation in these 
parts.
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A particularly warm welcome to those who will be testifying, and to their families. Thank 
you for your generosity, and in this province particularly, your courage In coming 
forward and exposing your pain to the gaze of the world. Only those who will find what 
they are looking for can, with any hope of credibility, accuse the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of bias, or of being a witch hunt...
We have deliberately sought that this first set of hearings should be victims' hearings, 
affording people, many, many of whom have never before had such an opportunity of 
telling their story...
The whole purpose of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is to make a 
contribution to the healing of our nation. The promotion of national unity and 
reconciliation is the title of the Act that brings us into existence. Almost all who have 
heard the testimony given at the previous hearings have been deeply moved, and 
believe that these hearings are indeed contributing to a national catharsis, are 
contributing to the healing of our nation. The wounds indeed are being opened and 
cleansed, and balm and ointment is poured on them, and they are being bound up so 
that they can heal and not fester.
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Extract 2
Commissioner Glenda Wildschut:
Monica I would like to thank you very much for coming, it's not an easy task to come 
before the Commission and to talk about something so painful and so close to you. It 
must be very-very difficult for you to do anything for yourself properly because as you 
pointed out you are right handed and your right arm has been shot off. It must be very 
sad for you everyday when you get dressed in the morning to look at your body and to 
look at yourself in the mirror and think that once before you had an arm and you were 
an outgoing person, who was able to go dancing and to enjoy life and now you cannot 
do that because you feel that in some way, a part of you has been taken away.
Extract 3 
Commissioner Alex Boraine:
Started, at the start, but you also had more trouble in ’76, in 1977, beatings, shooting, 
torture. So you have come a very-very long way and we’d like you to tell your story to 
all of us now, and not only to those in this room, but of course to many-many others 
who are listening on the radio, or perhaps will watch the television or read about it in 
the newspapers. You have a story that we all need to hear...
In Extract 1, the commissioner Chairperson Desmond Tutu’s words presents victimhood as so 
obvious, so well-known and basic, that its reality is not just compelling and explicable but
48
shared by the nation. He does this using a number of discursive strategies. The word “we” and 
the phrase “our nation” evokes a sense of commonality and sharedness in suffering. The use 
of “we” also presents the subject as an individual with whom to identify with in some ways, for 
instance emotionally and physically. In the second paragraph of the extract Tutu emphasizes 
the fundamental nature of victimhood and also serves a “warrant” of sorts asking for stories 
about it. His statement is an example of a repertoire that provides a sense of rightness and 
logic to the national call to participate in the national interest of “catharsis”. In Extract 3, a pre­
testimony commentary by Alex Boraine, the commissioner brings to the fore the victim as a 
willing participant, that is, willing to come from a “very long way” to help by telling her/his story. 
As a result, he claims, coming forward to share stories is a laudable decision. This decision, 
moreover, sides with a normative stance deemed to be “responsible”. It also provides a 
collective basis for rethinking selfhood in terms not far off from terms of nationhood. In this 
extract, the participatory discourse is presented not as an imposition but as an invitation, an 
opportunity -  which the subject is free to take up or to turn down -  to tell her stories. However, 
it is worth stressing that the call to participate is not by any chance “neutral”: it is about the 
governing of subjects to think and act in certain manners (Rose, 1989, 1999). Such a focus, 
however, makes the burdens of freedom even greater in the context of the TRC because it 
forces subjects to become further objectivized as willing participants in the objectives and 
aspirations of government.
In Extract 2 the victim is defined in keeping with normalized traits of victimhood: pain, sadness, 
inadequacy, inferior emotional states and so on. The subjective and political assumptions 
contained in these norms are obvious to a point (in this case, the individual is the innocent 
“heir” of an atrocious socio-political dispensation), even though aspects of it remain implicit 
since it rests upon the notion of normality as largely coterminous with those characteristics 
ascribed to non-victims. Through the emphasis on what makes the subject different,
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assumptions are made about what is considered normal or desirable. Indeed, the 
commissioner’s emphasis upon the difficulty involved in coming to testify before the 
Commission does little to dampen her professed faith in the victim’s ability to talk about 
Monica’s experience. Doing so is a sacrifice for national interest and the victim is thanked for 
coming to participate. As the extract demonstrates, this repertoire also involves an interesting 
element of subject-positioning, one that relies on her own position as an authority to construct 
the victimness of the victim: “a part of you has been taken away”. The commissioner refers to 
the fact that the experience of the victim is a dear one. Examining the extract through the lens 
of Tutu’s statement in the first extract this, arguably, appeals to the storyteller in the victim and 
can be said to be a viable solution to unburdening the soul, as it were. Again the certitude with 
which the commissioner infers about the testifier being an “outgoing person" keys into a sense 
of “expert-ness” that provides the basis for some kind of intervention. Commissioner 
Wildschut’s appeal to the logic of the experience as something “close” implies an insider’s 
viewpoint, invoking a set of discourses about the need to bring this hidden knowledge into the 
public realm and thus educate the public about the facts.
2. The voice of empathy 
Extract 4
Commissioner Desmond Tutu:
We know that this is going to be very difficult for you and it’s going to bring back sad 
memories. But we hope that by talking about the past you are going to be healed inside. 
Thank you for coming... [ TJhis is all going to hurt you a lot especially the way that we are
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doing, the way we are asking you this questions. But we hope that this opportunity for you 
to express yourself to get all these out of your chest is going to heal you...
Extract 5 
Commissioner Alex Boraine:
We have said many times and we have to say it again that we - we understand that it’s not 
easy. That - to go back and think again of the deep grief that you have endured, takes a 
great deal of courage and spirit and commitment. And we want to thank you right at the 
very beginning.
Ms Ngewu I am going to start with you as the chief witness, but all of you of course are 
important and have your own stories to te ll... Now Ms Ngewu I want you to take your time, 
I don’t want you to hurry, just talk at your own pace, I won’t interrupt you unless I want 
more information...
Extract 6 
Commissioner Richard Lyster:
Thank you very much. Then my word to you must be a very warm word of welcome on 
behalf of the Commission. It's not a very easy thing to be sitting where you are sitting. I am 
sure that you are feeling just a little nervous and uncomfortable... You can't watch and see 
what other people do, and where they stand, and where they sit, and you are a pioneer 
today, and that makes you very special. And we hope that you will be relaxed and feel that
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you're amongst friends, and that you can at last tell your story, not only to the Commission, 
not only to this audience in Durban, but throughout the country. We are very, very glad to 
see you today, and we wait to hear your story...
In Extracts 4, 5 and 6 above, the commissioners present the voice of highly knowledgeable but 
empathetic experts: the three of them speak authoritatively but with measured reassurance, 
perception and understanding of the victim’s concerns. This personal touch from the 
commissioners validates the stories about to be told and it courts the subjects’ and the 
audience’s emotional involvement. What emerges, as a result, is a sense of authority that 
avoids being authoritarian or preachy. Yet, this voice is inescapably authoritative and backed 
by institutional power, specifically power to define the parameters of victimhood. Regardless of 
intention, the commissioners frame victimhood as something to be expressed. Indeed, this is 
the case because discourses are powerful, shaping and suggestive.
In Extract 4, Tutu not only displays an orientation towards empathy and compassion, he 
presents himself and the government as responsive to the nature of victimhood. The sub-text 
of this account is that “they” are caring, thoughtful and actively engaged in finding solutions to 
the plight of the victim. A sympathetic tone is conveyed through techniques such as 
emphasizing their comprehension of the pain of being a victim “we understand”. Another 
technique is to lay emphasis on the effects a circumstance has had on the emotional state of 
the victim: in this case to result in “sad memories”. By weighting heavily the ability of the 
individual to tell her story, Tutu not only allocates some of the “content” of the victim’s 
subjectivity (see Burr, 2002), he presents the decision to come forward as rational, reasonable 
and practical. Tutu warns that telling stories would “hurt” but he understands. The hurt aside, 
the victim would be able to get rid of all the pain being carried and become healed as a result. 
In this extract, the discourse of the future is invoked and is directly linked to the interest of the
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victims: healing is in the future but it is to the benefit of the one telling her/his story. In Extract 5 
Boraine speaks persuasively, drawing on this repertoire to portray victims as wronged -  
suffering what he calls “deep grief -  but still going strong urges the testifier to take her time. 
But before saying this he reminds her as well as the other people testifying that they are 
important.
Worth recognizing here is the fact that the subject is constructed in these extracts through a 
broader language of therapy. From the perspective of this repertoire victimhood is looked at as 
an obstacle on the path to becoming a free individual. This is made evident in this repertoire 
through words carefully selected and combined for strategic therapeutic purposes. Good 
intentions notwithstanding, in his book Governing the Soul Nikolas Rose is suspicious of 
therapeutic interventions that flow from government. His critical historical perspective on “psy” 
practices -  including psychotherapy, social work and counselling -  offers a variety of insights 
(Rose, 1989:7-9). It does shed light on the problematic nature of classifying the victim, 
implicitly or explicitly, as deficient (having a need), weak (being needy) and an object of 
“healing”. This image of victimhood is in a large sense the product of a psychologically 
constructed way of reasoning, one that is prevalent in the discourse of therapy/healing (Rose, 
1989:255-258).
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Chapter Five
INTERPRETING THE DATA
While an extensive analysis of discourse was not undertaken here, this study has nevertheless 
been able to raise the importance of analysing discourse as knowledge about an object -  for 
instance, “victimhood”. This research also used the concepts and methods associated with 
discourse analysis to develop a critical analysis of knowledges and practices related to truth 
and reconciliation. As my analysis has shown, knowledges and practices bring the object into 
social reality and not the other way round. As my analysis has also shown, there are many 
intersecting discourses around victimhood, each producing and positioning the victim in its own 
way. In this study the discourses include the discourse of victimhood itself, the psychological 
discourse of therapy/healing, the discourse of participation, the discourse of truth and 
reconciliation and the discourse of the future.
On the whole, victimhood in the context of this research has traversed distinctive discourses 
and practice of truth and reconciliation -  in the context of a post-Apartheid future to which 
citizen-subjects are said to have a stake (Tutu, 1999). This post-Apartheid future, built on the 
back of a discourse of national unity and reconciliation, is captured by the likes of Desmond 
Tutu’s promotion of a future-orientated discourse of nation-building that is seen as taking on a 
pragmatic stature in that it allowed citizens and the nation to work together for the objective of 
reconciling deep divisions (Boraine, 2000).
Bringing a Foucauldian lens to all these meant paying attention -  first and foremost -  to both 
the formation and effects of these discourses. The Foucauldian analytic thus employed, 
especially in the focus on subject-positioning, has laid emphasis on the fact that these
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discourses are shaped through the medium of language -  not as groups of signs but as a 
coherent system of practices that produce the objects of which it describes. Discourses, then, 
do not merely describe the social world, but are the avenue through which the world of “reality” 
emerges. Besides, they contain subjects and construct objects (Parker, 1992). Yet, as they 
form objects and subjects, discourses go beyond the linguistic realm with attendant material 
effects. Indeed, at the institutional level of the TRC, these effects came to the fore through the 
layers of meaning brought to terms, metaphors and modes of understanding projected by 
specific types of discourses and repertoires. I analysed these in terms of the construction of 
victimhood, the logic of participation and in the light of two interpretive repertoires: the voice of 
the nation and the voice of empathy.
Broadly, the discourse of victimhood was at once internal and external to the testifying victims. 
Seamed to the Commission’s objective of fostering national reconciliation, the discourse 
entered into, opened up and shaped subjectivities through the construction of the identity of 
the victim in the Act and also through victims’ participation in the basic element of the 
Commission -  victim hearings through which stories of victimization emerged. The veracities of 
the construction of victimhood in the Act and hearings are crucial. The first implication is that 
victimhood is clearly embedded in a psychological discourse which accords importance to 
status of “victim” and the way it functions, what it makes possible, the sentiments it mobilizes 
and the regimes of truth constituted around it. The status of victim was an inherent aspect of 
the TRC’s discourse of victimhood, and it is though this prism that individuals that suffered 
Apartheid-era atrocities are positioned as needing restoration emotionally, mentally, rationally 
and economically by authority figures and expert knowledges in the TRC hearings. The second 
implication is one of the broader objective of simultaneously allowing the individual to 
participate in acts of citizenship, yet constructing frameworks within which subjectification is 
managed (Rose, 1999, 2000). Connected to this is the fact that in the TRC participation, along
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with the practices that strengthened it, was constitutive of what Rose (2000) has termed 
“games of citizenship”. On the one hand, these games activate people in ways reflective of a 
broad politics of governance premised on national reconciliation (Andrews, 2003; Humphrey, 
2005). On the other hand, they “make certain actions thinkable, possible and meaningful” and 
in like manner “shape what it is to be a citizen” (Rose, 2000:97). Arguably, in the case of the 
TRC, this formula was productive and had its own share of practical potentialities. It operated 
for the most part on the belief that individuals could be made to realize the objectives of truth- 
telling and reconciliation. Through their commitment to play a part in the process of giving 
testimony individuals could in fact become active -  not passive -  citizens in the new social 
order.
In this call to action, language determined the thinkable and the doable. This is because 
discourses do not only express, for example, the meaning of victimhood; they in fact make it 
possible to produce meanings about it. Discourses therefore also construct the phenomenon, 
in this case victimhood and the subject, in practice. It is not possible to produce meanings that 
are ultimately practices other than by the tools provided by discourses: discourses create 
conceptualizing spaces in which we can talk about or conceive a thing. In order for such 
discourses to be successful, the subject was first made aware of her condition, which itself was 
accomplished via an appeal to a body of knowledge that established the “truth” of causation 
and manifestation. The network of TRC commissioners’ statements has been a rich source of 
material to illustrate this. Thus, in this context to recognize oneself as a victim is to be made 
cognizant of the experience and the condition of victimhood, which are actively reinforced by 
the proclamations of expert authorities. Even though this analysis has been skewed to 
highlight the positioning effect of the commissioners’ comments, expert knowledge cannot be 
said to have achieved its aim until the subject actively constructs her stories in relation to these 
comments, and conceives of her subjectivity and experiences as consistent with or capable of
56
coinciding with the enunciations of expert authorities. Indeed, once the individual takes up a 
subject-position as her own, she inevitably “sees” from and through that position. Her seeing 
becomes further reinforced by the particular images, metaphors, concepts and stories which 
are made available within the discursive frame in which she is positioned and operates from.
The Foucauldian approach I have taken in my analysis has drawn attention to how subjects 
are created as well as to the ways in which the TRC commissioners used a multitude of 
discourses surrounding victimhood to position subjects as victims. What this has enabled is the 
ways in which particular subjectivities are created and mobilized. In a way, the discourse of 
victimhood -  and the assemblage of procedures built up around it -  manifests as a project of 
subjectivity, one that has evolved over time to reflect a dominant view of the subject. The study 
has also disturbed the idea that victimhood -  or victimization for that matter -  necessarily 
conflates with an essentialized view of subjecthood. It has thus taken issue with a naturalizing 
view of victimhood, assumed to be fundamental to the victim’s selfhood or subjectivity, but with 
the effect that individuals are invariably reduced to that status.
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Chapter Six
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
6.1 Main findings
This dissertation has adopted a discursive perspective to interrogate subjectivity and the 
discourse of victimhood that operated within the TRC’s participatory framework of victim 
hearings. The study has been able to foreground an analysis that is theoretically informed, 
empirically grounded and critical. In the context of this study, this has been achieved because 
it is not the duty of the discourse analyst to set criteria for what is and then measure 
phenomena against this standard. Rather, the analyst’s role consists of examining what has 
been said and what they imply -  what is effectively based on an analytic reading of the texts, 
influenced by theory and personal judgement.
My understanding of victimhood as a discursive site has been a crucial element of the study. 
Differing from essentialist approaches, I have not assumed that victimhood has a foundation 
outside of discourse or of discursive practices. Instead, I have treated victimhood as “a site of 
a multiplicity of practices or labours” (Rose, 1996c:300) that have been shaped within 
discourses and their associated institutional locations that, over time, have changed the nature 
of what is known and experienced as “real”. It has emerged from this analysis that through 
diverse authority figures -  or experts -  who employ expert knowledges or discourses the TRC 
was able to carry out the national vision of reconciliation. Making the notion of victim a 
touchstone in the TRC was effective because it drew on a widely-shared understanding that it 
will be the victim whose life would be influenced most by the process of truth-telling, healing 
and national reconciliation. In many ways, however, it produced the victim as being able to
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participate in that very process by being a part of the hearings conducted by the Commission. 
As a relational subject caught up in a triad of expert-self-audience, the victim was positioned in 
line with a range of discourses, practices and norms which would enable aspects of the self to 
be problematized and accessible as well as subject to various disciplinary practices, in a 
choreography of truth-telling carefully orchestrated by the commissioners.
It has also emerged from this study that the discourse of victimhood in the TRC is not a 
discrete or monolithic set of ideas or practices but is made up of many interwoven discourses 
which mediate subjectivities and subject-positions and make problems intelligible and 
manageable. These discourses are steeped in a diverse range of assumptions, beliefs, norms 
and vocabularies about the subject as well as about capacities of individuals to act, freedom 
and responsibility (see Rose, 1999). Rather than seeing victimhood as an essential state, it is 
more productive to see it as socially and discursively determined by a community of human 
agents. Hence it is the case that the “truth” about victimhood (or reconciliation for that matter) 
is far too complex to warrant an easy analysis; thus its parameters must be negotiated within a 
vast field of knowledges about how subjects and subjectivities are produced and positioned.
Given the nature of the overlap between the discourses at work at any time, victimhood cannot 
be “read” as a single discourse within the TRC because other discourses operate 
simultaneously with it, setting the frame for what it was possible to say or do. Overall, the study 
has demonstrated how sophisticated discourses, norms and values about what is desirable 
and possible operate, and the kinds of effects they produce. The study has offered a broad, 
“macro” look at the discursive practices, altogether an aspect of a complex web of institutions, 
agents, norms and practices of the TRC proceedings. This was done through a focus on 
aspects of the discourse of victimhood as it played out in the official documents and hearings
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of the Commission, and -  relatedly -  through a study of language use in the statements of the 
TRC commissioners.
As this study has demonstrated, assigning positions involves the aligning of subjects to 
discourses as well as to social structures such as institutions, actors and programmes. Indeed, 
subject-positions play out through institutional identities and subjectivities, operating together 
with the complex nexus of factors that fashion an individual as a specific kind of subject. As I 
work from the premise that positioning is discursively achieved, in this study I was able to 
establish the ways in which authority figures employed two kinds of repertoires to present 
knowledges about victimhood and to position subjects at the same time. Stuart Hall’s thought 
on the subjectifying role of knowledge buttresses this point: “The knowledge which a discourse 
produces constitutes a kind of power, exercised over those who are ‘known’. When that 
knowledge is exercised in practice, those who are ‘known’ in a particular way will be subject 
(i.e. subjected) to it” (Hall, 1992:295). Discourses specify subject-positions for the subjects to 
take up, but as the wording of the Act shows it is the enactment of those discourses that made 
positioning possible.
Besides, the notion of positioning further directs us to closely examine how social reality is 
physically and symbolically realized in interaction -  in the interplay of discourse, situations and 
locations. The research brought home the part played by discourse not only in the reification of 
victimhood but the construction and positioning of the subject, and the value of the study as 
such is the possibility of looking at the “order” of discourse as well as the vagaries of 
subjectivity. In the case of the TRC, discourses created and legitimated the storytelling arenas 
of the hearings by classifying the subjectivities and positions of various individuals -  in this 
case, “victims” -  with national reconciliation. Finally, through discursive repertoires drawn on 
by the commissioners discourses shaped the possible range of behaviours and actions in line
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with a delimited set of values coterminous with the national vision of reconciliation (often in 
conjunction with an overarching therapeutic disposition).
6.2 Limitations of study
This study, overall, reveals useful information to begin a reimagining of the South African truth 
and reconciliation process in terms of victimhood. With that said, however, there are some 
limitations to the overall analysis. For one, because the subject’s response to the ways in 
which she was positioned in relation to discourses and repertoires was not considered, few 
clues have been yielded as to how effective the various discourses and strategies described in 
the analysis were. Few clues have emerged too about the capacity of discourse to restrict the 
scope of human agency and also the potential for contesting its limits and strictures. This 
would have been useful for gaining a nuanced understanding of agency and its specific 
enactments, especially whether an individual’s participation actually represents passivity, 
conformity or resistance to these discourses -  as well as the intersections in places between 
passivity, conformity and resistance. Thus the picture presented in this study is not complete; I 
hope that this shortcoming can be remedied in future study.
Furthermore, this study could be improved by greater depth and theoretical and 
methodological complexity. The main strength of the discursive approach taken here is that it 
highlights the importance of foregoing the assumption of a priori knowledge about victimhood. 
If anything, the study operated on the basis that if there is to be knowledge, it first has to be 
discursively constituted. As a methodology, however, discourse analysis is effective (and also 
weak) to the extent that it stays at the level of discourse, meaning that hidden or unconscious 
factors do not count. This admittedly does little to show that “discourse” is difficult to tame
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owing to the fact that it takes several forms and meanings in different contexts, or that there is 
much to be said about the (insurmountable) material, psychic and spatial play on the 
discursive -  especially in relation to the settings of the hearings. For the purposes of this 
project, discourse analysis was employed at the level of the textual to analyse the constructive 
and functional nature of discourse and its role in the testimony work of the TRC. I however 
believe that taking discourse as not only more-than-text but also as occurring in the most 
unlikely places may reveal additional themes as well as open new paths in terms of data. 
Indeed, research that problematizes discourse only in the simplistic sense of the textual in the 
production and constitution of the social world can become severely handicapped if it assumes 
it has exhausted reality by that fact. The major shortcoming of much of discourse theory is that 
it highlights the textual, rather than the immaterial, nature of discourse. Discourse analysis 
must confront the “stories” not told in official documents or realizable in language. It therefore 
must confront issues concerning the oral transmission of history and its encounter between 
politics, memory and subjectivity. It also must confront the psychic by mediating between the 
trajectories of language and silence.
6.3 Possible directions for future research
Given the limited scope of the present study, it has only been possible to pursue a narrow line 
of inquiry into discourse, subjectivity and subject-positioning. It is however possible to examine 
many other cross-cutting issues in-depth at the doctoral level. I believe that the present study 
offers a remarkable opportunity to examine technologies of citizen participation in the South 
African foray into national reconciliation, especially as this is increasingly being orchestrated by 
multiple forms of expertise which are themselves coevolving with new forms of governance 
and power. Within this scope, it is also possible to look more closely at the ways in which
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“expertise” (or “expert knowledge”) as well as registers such as “responsibility”, 
“empowerment” and “active citizenship” are implicated in the participatory discourse employed 
by the TRC. Similarly, through the trajectory set out by this analysis it is possible to interrogate 
the discursive and material processes through which these occur in response to the rising 
influence of a therapeutic culture (and in fact the therapeutic state) and the corresponding 
impact of these upon the positioning of therapeutic expertise in contemporary South Africa.
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Appendix A
Abridged version o f the PROMOTION OF NATIONAL UNITY AND 
RECONCILIATION ACT, 1995
2 6 July 1995  - -  -... -..
NO. 34 OF 1995: PROMOTION OF NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION ACT, 1995.
It is hereby notified that the President has assented to the following Act
which is hereby published for general information:-
ACT
To provide for the investigation and the establishment of as complete a picture 
aspossible of the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights 
committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date contemplated 
in the Constitution, within or outside the Republic, emanating from the 
conflicts of the past, and the fate or whereabouts of the victims of such 
violations; the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all 
the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political objective 
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past during the said period; 
affording victims an opportunity to relate the violations they suffered; the 
taking of measures aimed at the granting of reparation to, and the 
rehabilitation and the restoration of the human and civil dignity of, victims 
of violations of human rights; reporting to the Nation about such violations 
and victims; the making of recommendations aimed at the prevention of the 
commission of gross violations, of human rights; and for the said purposes to 
provide for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a 
Committee on Human Rights Violations, a Committee on Amnesty and a Committee on 
Reparation and Rehabilitation; and to confer certain powers on, assign certain 
functions to and impose certain duties upon that Commission and those 
Committees; and to provide for matters connected therewith.
SINCE the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of'
1993), provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society 
characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future 
founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence 
for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex;
AND SINCE it is deemed necessary to establish the truth in relation to past 
events as well as the motives for and circumstances in which gross violations 
of human fights have occurred, and to make the findings known in order to 
prevent a repetition of such acts in future;
AND SINCE the Constitution states that the pursuit of national unity, the 
well-being of all South African citizens and peace require reconciliation 
between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society;
AND SINCE the Constitution states that there is a need for understanding but 
not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for 
ubuntu but not for victimization;
AND SINCE the Constitution states that in order to advance such reconciliation 
and reconstruction amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and 
offences associated with political objectives committed in the course of the 
conflicts of the past;
AND SINCE the Constitution provides that Parliament shall under the Constitution 
adopt a law which determines a firm cut-off date, which shall be a date after 8 
October 1990 and before the cut-off date envisaged in the Constitution, and 
providing for the mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if 
any, through which such amnesty shall be dealt with;
(English text signed by the President.)
(Assented to 19 July 1995.)
BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED by the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, as 
follows:- 
CHAPTER 1
Interpretation and application
Definitions
1. (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates-
(i) "act associated with a political objective" has the meaning ascribed 
thereto in section 20(2) and (3); (ii)
(ii) "article" includes any evidence, book, document, file, object, 
writing, recording or transcribed computer printout produced by 
any mechanical or electronic device or any device by means of 
which information is recorded, stored or transcribed; (xix)
(iii) "Commission" means the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
established by section 2; (ix)
(iv) "commissioner" means a member of the Commission appointed in terms 
of section 7(2)(a); (viii)
(v) "committee" means the Committee on Human Rights Violations, the 
Committee on Amnesty or the Committee on Reparation and 
Rehabilitation, as the case may be; (vii)
(vi) "Constitution" means the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993); (iv)
(vii) "cut-off date" means the latest date allowed as the cut-off date 
in terms of the Constitution as set out under the heading
"National Unity and Reconciliation"; (i)
(viii) "former state" means any state or territory which was established 
by an Act of Parliament or by proclamation in terms of such an Act 
prior to the commencement of the Constitution and the territory of 
which now forms part of the Republic; (xvii)
(ix) "gross violation of human rights" means the violation of human 
rights through-
(a) the killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment of any 
person; or
(b) any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or
procurement to commit an act referred to in paragraph (a) , 
which emanated from conflicts of the past and which was 
committed during the period 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date 
within or outside the Republic, and the commission of which 
was advised, planned, directed, commanded or ordered, by any 
person acting with a political motive; (v)
(x) "joint committee" means a joint committee of the Houses of 
Parliament appointed in accordance with the Standing Orders of 
Parliament for the purpose of considering matters referred to it 
in terms of this Act; (iii)
(xi) "Minister" means the Minister of Justice; (x)
(xii) "prescribe" means prescribe by regulation made under section 4 0; 
(xviii)
(xiii) "President" means the President of the Republic; (xi)
(xiv) "reparation" includes any form of compensation, ex gratia payment, 
restitution, rehabilitation or recognition; (vi)
(xv) "Republic" means the Republic of South Africa referred to in 
section 1(2) of the Constitution; (xii)
(xvi) "security forces" includes any full-time or part-time-
(a) member or agent of the South African Defence Force, the South 
African Police, the National Intelligence Service, the Bureau
of State Security, the Department of Correctional Services, or 
any of their organs;
(b) member or agent of a defence force, police force, intelligence 
agency or prison service of any former state, or any of their 
organs; (xvi)
(xvii) "State" means the State of the Republic; (xiv)
(xviii) "subcommittee" means any subcommittee established by the 
Commission in terms of section 5(c); (xv)
(xix) "victims" includes-
(a) persons who, individually or together with one or more 
persons, suffered harm in the form of physical or mental 
injury, emotional suffering, pecuniary loss or a substantial 
impairment of human rights-
(1) as a result of a gross violation of human rights; or
(ii) as a result of an act associated with a political 
objective for which amnesty has been granted;
(b) persons who, individually or together with one or more 
persons, suffered harm in the form of physical or mental 
injury, emotional suffering, pecuniary loss or a substantial 
impairment of human rights, as a result of such person 
intervening to assist persons contemplated in paragraph (a) 
who were in distress or to prevent victimization of such 
persons; and
(c) such relatives or dependants of victims as may be prescribed.
(xiii)
(2) For the purposes of sections 10(1), (2) and (3) and II and Chapters 6
and 7 "Commission" shall be construed as including a reference to "committee" or 
subcommittee", as the case may be, and "Chairperson", "Vice-Chairperson" or 
commissioner" shall be construed as including a reference to the chairperson, 
vice-chairperson or a member of a committee or subcommittee, as the case may be. 
CHAPTER 2
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Establishment and seat of Truth and Reconciliation Commission
2. (1) There is hereby established a juristic person to be known as the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
(2) The seat of the Commission shall be determined by the President.
Objectives of Commission
3. (1) The objectives of the Commission shall be to promote national unity
and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts 
and divisions of the past by-
la) establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, 
nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights which 
were committed during the period from I March 1960 to the cut-off 
date, including the antecedents, circumstances, factors and context 
of such violations, as well as the perspectives of the victims and 
the motives and perspectives of the persons responsible for the 
commission of the violations, by conducting investigations and 
holding hearings;
(b) facilitating the granting of amnesty to persons who make full 
disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated 
with a political objective and comply with the requirements of this 
Act;
(c) establishing and making known the fate or whereabouts of victims 
and by restoring the human and civil dignity of such victims by 
granting them an opportunity to relate their own accounts of the 
violations of which they are the victims, and by recommending 
reparation measures in respect of them;
(d) compiling a report providing as comprehensive an account as 
possible of the activities and findings of the Commission 
contemplated in paragraphs (a) , •■•"■'(b) and (c), and which contains 
recommendations of measures to prevent the future violations of 
human rights.
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not be interpreted as limiting 
the power of the Commission to investigate or make recommendations concerning 
any matter with a view to promoting or achieving national unity and 
reconciliation within the context of this Act.
(3) In order to achieve the objectives of the Commission-
(a) the Committee on Human Rights Violations, as contemplated in 
Chapter 3, shall deal, among other things, with matters pertaining 
to investigations of gross violations of human rights;
(b) the Committee on Amnesty, as contemplated in Chapter 4, shall deal 
with matters relating to amnesty;
(c) the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation, as contemplated in 
Chapter 5, shall deal with matters referred to it relating to 
reparations;
(d) the investigating unit referred to in section 5(d) shall perform 
the investigations contemplated in section 28(4) (a); and
(e) the subcommittees shall exercise, perform and carry out the powers, 
functions and duties conferred upon, assigned to or imposed upon
them by the Commission.
Functions of Commission
4. The functions of the Commission shall be to achieve its objectives, and 
to that end the Commission shall-
(a) facilitate, and where necessary initiate or coordinate, inquiries 
into-
(i) gross violations of human rights, including violations which 
were part of a systematic pattern of abuse;
(ii) the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human 
rights, including the antecedents, circumstances, factors, 
context, motives and perspectives which led to such violations;
(iii) the identity of all persons, authorities, institutions and 
organisations involved in such violations;
(iv) the question whether such violations were the result of 
deliberate planning on the part of the State or a former state 
or any of their organs, or of any political organisation,
liberation movement or other group or individual; and
(v) accountability, political or otherwise, for any such violation;
(b) facilitate, and initiate or coordinate, the gathering of information 
and the receiving of evidence from any person, including persons 
claiming to be victims of such violations or the representatives of 
such victims, which establish the identity of victims of such 
violations, their fate or present whereabouts and the nature and 
extent of the harm suffered by such victims;
(c) facilitate and promote the granting of amnesty in respect of acts 
associated with political objectives, by receiving from persons 
desiring to make a full disclosure of all the relevant facts 
relating to such acts, applications for the granting of amnesty in 
respect of such acts, and transmitting such applications to the 
Committee on Amnesty for its decision, and by publishing decisions 
granting amnesty, in the Gazette;
(d) determine what articles have been destroyed by any person in order to 
conceal violations of human rights or acts associated with a 
political objective;
(e) prepare a comprehensive report which sets out its activities and 
findings, based on factual and objective information and evidence 
collected or received by it or placed at its disposal;
(f) make recommendations to the President with regard to-
(i) the policy which should be followed or measures which should be 
taken with regard to the granting of reparation to victims or
the taking of other measures aimed at rehabilitating and 
restoring the human and civil dignity of victims;
(ii) measures which should be taken to grant urgent interim 
reparation to victims;
(g) make recommendations to the Minister with regard to the development of
a limited witness protection programme for the purposes of this Act;
(h) make recommendations to the President with regard to the creation 
institutions conducive to a stable and fair society and the 
institutional, administrative and legislative measures which should 
be taken or introduced in order to prevent the commission of 
violations of human rights.
Appendix B
On Method of Selecting Samples
Having gathered massive testimonial evidence provided by the transcripts (available online at the 
TRC website <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/trc_frameset.htm>), there came a time when it was 
necessary to establish a strategy for selecting a suitably representative sample that merged scope 
and coherence together. This involved approaching the transcripts in the old-fashioned way -  that is, 
doing close reading, underlining important paragraphs and categorizing into themes. Eventually, five 
transcripts were selected from a pool of 33. To guide my selection I asked myself repeatedly: “What 
kind of devices is this speaker using to account for the other’s experience?”. Also, questions such 
as: “Why was this said?”; What functions are fulfilled by making this particular statement?” and 
“What effects are typically associated with the choice of words/images used?” were asked of the 
selected texts. The aim was to explore the connotations, allusions and implications of the sentences 
in order to draw meanings from them.
Working with every page of even a highly narrowed down sample like this still created an enormous 
amount of material and because of space limitations, very short extracts from the transcripts had to 
be mined. These extracts not only had to make sense to me, they also had to be good 
representations generally giving tone to the question of function -  what does a word, phrase or 
statement do and with what effects?. To make my job of extraction easier I adopted a simple text 
mining method to identify the most relevant features of the transcripts following a prepared 
concordance of words and phrases (see below). This entailed importing the transcripts into the 
Microsoft Word environment, using the software’s search facility to guide the extraction of portions 
that I decided was in some way related to my research focus, using the following words and phrases 
as a guide:
1) coming forward
2) grief
3) healing
4) memory
5) nation
6) pain
7) reconciliation
8) sorrow
9) suffering
10) sympathy
11) tell story
Process of analysing data pertaining to the 2 discursive repertoires
In analysing my data (specifically extracts from transcripts of the HRVC proceedings) in the section 
focusing on discursive repertoires I followed an approach used by Edley (2001) in his analysis of 
interpretative repertoires in relation to masculinity discourse. This analytical procedure, which is 
quite popular in critical psychology but is no doubt not yet common in other social sciences, gives 
room for the researcher to analyse data creatively by placing blocks of extracts above the body of 
the analysis and to draw on them to produce a narrative form.
Appendix C
Analysed transcripts from the Human Rights Violations Committee (HRVC) hearings
Extracts 1 & 6 
Source:
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
Proceedings Held at Durban on 7 May 1996
CHAIRPERSON (Commissioner Tutu): I greet you today. We welcome you with warm hearts at 
this fourth meeting of the commission, of the Truth and Conciliation. We welcome you to the 
fourth public hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission after the meetings in East 
London, Cape Town and Gauteng.
We do want to express our deepest sympathy to those who are suffering as a result of the 
ongoing violence in this province, and express our distress that violence seems to be endemic 
in these parts. We hope that work of the Commission may make some kind of contribution to the 
ending of violence, and to the promotion of reconciliation in these parts.
A particularly warm welcome to those who will be testifying, and to their families. Thank you for 
your generosity, and in this province particularly, your courage in coming forward and exposing 
your pain to the gaze of the world. Only those who will find what they are looking for can, with 
any hope of credibility, accuse the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of bias, or of being a 
witch hunt. The previous three hearings have shown how determined we are to be completely 
even-handed and unbiased. The whole political spectrum has been represented in those 
hearings, and I am certain these hearings here will be no exception to that characteristic. All 
sides of the conflict of the past have been, and will be, represented. We cannot pretend that we 
are not sad at the fact that a very substantial, very important role-player in the IFP at the present 
time does not seek to co-operate with the Commission. But if no one comes from their side to 
tell their story it won't be the TRC that has to bear the blame for being one-sided.
We have deliberately sought that this first set of hearings should be victims' hearings, affording 
people, many, many of whom have never before had such an opportunity of telling their story. 
Those who may be named will be given, or have been given, what we consider to be 
reasonable and timeous notice, so that they can make representations. We want to give an 
assurance that we will, as soon as possible, give such persons the opportunity to tell their side 
of the story, and perhaps accord them the privilege of limited cross-examination of those who 
have so accused them.
The whole purpose of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is to make a contribution to the 
healing of our nation. The promotion of national unity and reconciliation is the title of the Act that 
brings us into existence. Almost all who have heard the testimony given at the previous 
hearings have been deeply moved, and believe that these hearings are indeed contributing to a 
national catharsis, are contributing to the healing of our nation. The wounds indeed are being 
opened and cleansed, and balm and ointment is poured on them, and they are being bound up 
so that they can heal and not fester.
I repeat my urgent appeal to everybody, but mostly to our brothers and sisters amongst the 
Afrikaans-speaking community. Everybody knows that when an Afrikaner sees the light, and 
recognises it to be the light, then nothing can hold him back, he becomes very enthusiastic. An 
Afrikaner gives his best. We are a very odd community. We were created by God the Father out 
of His love for us all, and we were redeemed from evil by the blood of Christ. He led us out of 
the slavery of sin, and now God, the Holy Spirit, dwells in us all. We are people of grace. Almost 
everybody who has testified before us thus far are people who are not looking for revenge. They 
don't carry hatred around in their hearts. They simply want to know the truth, and then they are 
prepared to forgive. The Afrikaner can make a huge contribution to the healing and 
reconciliation which is taking place in our country. There is a great challenge and a big role for 
him in our life in this country, and I therefore repeat my urgent appeal to all of us. Please if you 
would just repent, if you would just confess, people will be prepared to forgive, then we can all 
be healed. We have the example of the Churchman whose letter we have read.
(Incomplete)... are only the first four, and because they have been of symbolic significance they 
have been fairly large hearings. After these we intend to split up as the Human Rights Violations 
Committee, perhaps one Commissioner with one Committee Member, and to have often 
simultaneous hearings in as many parts of our country as possible, to give as many people an 
opportunity as possible to tell their stories. We will not make an immediate finding in these 
hearings. That will happen a little later.
Those who give evidence here enjoy the same privilege as would happen in a court of law. If a 
witness deliberately gives the Commission false testimony then he or she will be guilty of an 
offence, as would be the case in a court of law. This is not a court, but we know you will conduct 
yourselves with proper decorum. As I have said before, I do not wish to invoke the powers 
vested in me.
Thank you to all who uphold us in their prayers as these hearings get under way, and so I 
declare this session of the hearings open. I want to hand over now to Dr Borraine, but before I 
do so may I first of all introduce the panel that is here with me.
Emily Sikadi Magashule
MR LYSTER: Thank you very much. Then my word to you must be a very warm word of 
welcome on behalf of the Commission. It's not a very easy thing to be sitting where you are 
sitting. I am sure that you are feeling just a little nervous and uncomfortable, because you are 
the very first. You can't watch and see what other people do, and where they stand, and where 
they sit, and you are a pioneer today, and that makes you very special. And we hope that you 
will be relaxed and feel that you're amongst friends, and that you can at last tell your story, not 
only to the Commission, not only to this audience in Durban, but throughout the country. We are 
very, very glad to see you today, and we wait to hear your story. Before you do that I must ask 
you to please stand.
MR LYSTER: Thank you, you may be seated. Mrs Magashule, for everyone who comes before 
the Commission we ask one of our Commissioners or Committee Members to assist that person 
as they tell the story. We want to underline, however, that it's your story, and only you can tell 
that story. And today I am going to ask my colleague, Dr Khoza Mgojo, to assist you, and I am 
going to hand over to him now. Thank you.
Mrs Magashule, can you just help us a little. We know that you've been deeply hurt, you want to 
come here and tell us everything. I will ask you to start relating your story to us. You can now 
start. (Pause) Let her remove her earphones so that she can tell us her story.
Extract 2 
Source:
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
VICTIM: MONICA DANIELS 
NATURE OF VIOLENCE: SHOT BY POLICE 
TESTIMONY FROM: MONICA DANIELS 
Proceedings Held at Cape Town on 7 August 1996
Glenda Wildschut: Monica I would like to thank you very much for coming, it's not an easy task 
to come before the Commission and to talk about something so painful and so close to you. It 
must be very-very difficult for you to do anything for yourself properly because as you pointed 
out you are right handed and your right arm has been shot off. It must be very sad for you 
everyday when you get dressed in the morning to look at your body and to look at yourself in the 
mirror and think that once before you had an arm and you were an outgoing person, who was 
able to go dancing and to enjoy life and now you cannot do that because you feel that in some 
way, a part of you has been taken away. And we feel that we would like to assure you that the 
Commission will do particularly the reparations and rehabilitation’s committee will do whatever 
we can to try and make it a bit more comfortable for you. I think that it is possible that a artificial 
limb can be fitted onto your shoulder very comfortably and that you'll be able to use it in a way 
that will make your life a little bit better. Apart from the other request that you have made, I wish 
you very well and we have listened to everything that you have asked us. Thank you for coming. 
— Thank you.
Extract 3 
Source:
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
VICTIM: Nomakula Evelyn Zweni 
VIOLATION: shooting, torture and beating 
TESTIMONIES FROM: NOMAKULA EVELYN ZWENI 
GIRLSIE NYENYEMBEZI
Proceedings Held at Cape Town on 22 August 1996 
DR BORAINE:
Started, at the start, but you also had more trouble in ’76, in 1977, beatings, shooting, torture. 
So you have come a very-very long way and we’d like you to tell your story to all of us now, and 
not only to those in this room, but of course to many-many others who are listening on the radio, 
or perhaps will watch the television or read about it in the newspapers. You have a story that we 
all need to hear. And Pumla Gobodo is going to help you as you tell that story.
Extract 4
Source:
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
VICTIM: Fuzile Petros Juqu [son]
VIOLATION: KILLING
TESTIMONIES FROM: Nodwzakazi Juqu [mother]
MRJUQU
Proceedings Held at Cape Town on 23 April 1996 
CHAIRPERSON:
We know that this is going to be very difficult for you and it’s going to bring back sad memories. 
But we hope that by talking about the past you are going to be healed inside. Thank you for 
coming. The lawyer Mr Ntsebeza is going to help you while you are trying to tell us your story.
CHAIRPERSON:
I had already welcomed you, I mean now that this is all going to hurt you a lot especially the way 
that we are doing, the way we are asking you this questions. But we hop that this opportunity for 
you to express yourself to get all these out of your chest is going to heal you. Mr Dumisa 
Ntsebeza is going to help you along with the story.
MS SOOKA:
Sir this is a very difficult question that I am going to ask you now, I am going to ask you in 
English. I think we cannot even miss the pain and the sorrow because it is reflected in your face. 
There is the question of whether you might want to meet the people or the person who killed 
your son. What - what is your thinking about that?
CHAIRPERSON:
Sir and you madam we know we cannot - we can never say we are God’s we cannot even say 
that you - we can - we can make things right again for you. We are all people and we come from 
this apartheid and it’s headships.
As you have said that the operation has put you into headship, and we can - we also can never 
forget what happened in our country. We would like it to change as Ms Budon has said in our 
country if - if a teenager hasn’t come home at a time when you said he must come in, we 
wouldn’t like to go to hospitals and prisons and moduaries.
We would just say now - we would prefer to say now my child has just went away with his 
friends. For us to be able to reach that stage, it is because of people like you, people who had 
come forward. People who were victims, it is those people who are - who have made us to be 
here today.
We would like co-operation between whites and blacks so that in this new South Africa there 
should never be a day again where all these things that happened in the past should happen 
again. We wouldn’t like a time to come when a father and a mother to come again in a - to
something like this Commission only to tell us that I found my son’s shirt torn by bullets as if it 
was eaten by rats. We thank you for coming up here.
Extract 5 
Source:
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
VICTIM: Christopher Piet [son]
VIOLATION: KILLING 
TESTIMONY FROM: Cynthia Ngewu 
IRENE MTSINGWA 
MS KHONELE 
MIA EUNICE THEMBISO
Proceedings Held at Cape Town on 23 April 1996 
DR BORAINE:
Before we start I want to make absolutely sure that you are hearing my voice and much more 
importantly then you are hearing the translation into Xhosa.
Is that all right, can you hear the translation - good - good. Well then I would like to welcome all 
four of you to the Commission and on behalf of the Chairperson and my fellow Commissioners 
to express first our appreciation to you for being willing to come to the hearings.
We have said many times and we have to say it again that we - we understand that it’s not 
easy. That - to go back and think again of the deep grief that you have endured, takes a great 
deal of courage and spirit and commitment. And we want to thank you right at the very 
beginning.
Ms Ngewu I am going to start with you as the chief witness, but all of you of course are 
important and have your own stories to tell. And I am going to ask you Ms Ngewu if you will 
stand please so that we can take the oath.
DR BORAINE:
Now Ms Ngewu I want you to take your time, I don’t want you to hurry, just talk at your own 
pace, I won’t interrupt you unless I want more information and I want to take you back to the 3rd 
of March 1986. Can you tell me what happened on that day.
